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Abstract
The paper investigates behavioural equivalence between programs in a call-by-value functional
language extended with a signature of (algebraic) effect-triggering operations. Two programs are
considered as being behaviourally equivalent if they enjoy the same behavioural properties. To
formulate this, we define a logic whose formulas specify behavioural properties. A crucial ingredient
is a collection of modalities expressing effect-specific aspects of behaviour. We give a general theory
of such modalities. If two conditions, openness and decomposability, are satisfied by the modalities
then the logically specified behavioural equivalence coincides with a modality-defined notion of
applicative bisimilarity, which can be proven to be a congruence by a generalisation of Howe’s
method. We show that the openness and decomposability conditions hold for several examples of
algebraic effects: nondeterminism, probabilistic choice, global store and input/output.
1 Introduction
Many tasks in software development and analysis rely on abstracting away from program syntax
to an appropriate notion of program behaviour. For example, the goal of specification is to specify
(constraints on) the behaviour of a program. Similarly, verification concerns validating that a program
indeed exhibits the behaviour specified. Closely associated with the general concept of behaviour is
the related concept of behavioural equivalence, under which two programs are deemed equivalent if
they exhibit the same behaviour.
Studying the interrelated concepts of behaviour and equivalence is important from both theo-
retical and practical perspectives. On the theoretical side, these are fundamental notions, whose
understanding sheds light not just on any particular programming language under consideration, but
more generally on the question of how to mathematically model the process of computation. On the
practical side, the engineering tasks of program specification, verification and synthesis all depend on
having a precise mathematical model of program behaviour; and notions of program equivalence play
a key role in applications, such as compiler optimisation, that involve program transformation.
For applications such as those described above to be possible, it is crucial that the mathematical
notion of behaviour is appropriately chosen. For example, in the case of compiler transformations,
it is essential that aspects of computational behaviour, such as execution time, that one specifically
does not want preserved, are ignored. Whereas, for other applications, for example ones in which
resources need to be quantified, it may be important to have a notion of behaviour in which execution
time is taken into account. In general, therefore, there is no single all-encompassing approach to
defining behaviour and equivalence. Nonetheless, as general desirability criteria, one would like to
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have definitions that are, on the one hand, mathematically natural and convenient to work with and,
on the other, suitable for practical applications.
In the present paper, we explore and relate two complementary methodologies for defining no-
tions of behaviour and equivalence, within a particular programming context: call-by-value functional
programming with effects. The methodologies themselves make sense, however, within a more-or-less
arbitrary programming context, so we introduce and motivate them at this greater generality.
Behavioural logic The first methodology is to specify program behaviour via a formal logic, which
we call a behavioural logic, whose formulas φ are constructed using operators that express primitive
properties of program behaviour. Mathematically, one defines a satisfaction relation M |= φ, express-
ing that program M satisfies behavioural property φ. The idea is that the logic should be designed in
such a way that its formulas φ are capable of expressing all properties of programs that are bona fide
properties of program behaviour (as opposed to, for example, properties of program syntax).
Given such a program logic, one derives a corresponding notion of behavioural equivalence. Two
programs M,N are said be logically equivalent if, for all formulas φ, it holds that M |= φ iff N |= φ;
that is if they exhibit the same behaviour.
Bisimilarity It is a remarkably general phenomenon that, in numerous computation contexts, pro-
gram behaviour can be modelled as an interactive process, leading to a natural coinductive definition
of program equivalence as bisimilarity : roughly speaking, the largest (equivalence) relation that relates
interaction points only if their local behaviour is indistinguishable modulo the relation.
Having given such a mathematical definition of bisimilarity, one can derive an associated notion of
behavioural property. Namely, a property of programs is behavioural if it respects bisimilarity; that
is, whenever a program M satisfies the property, then so does any bisimilar program M ′.
The above complementary approaches to defining behaviour and equivalence have been particularly
prominent in concurrency theory. Indeed, the idea of bisimilarity as a notion of behavioural equiva-
lence between systems was first introduced in that context, in the work of Milner and Park [26, 31].
The logical approach to defining behaviour emerged around the same time, with the characterisa-
tion, by Hennessy and Milner, of bisimilarity as the behavioural equivalence induced by an infinitary
propositional modal logic, now known as Hennessy-Milner logic [9].
In the case of bisimilarity, Abramsky realised that a similar style of definition generalises to other
programming contexts. In particular, he developed the notion of applicative bisimilarity for functional
languages [2]. Subsequently, numerous variant notions of bisimilarity have been given across a plethora
of computational contexts (for example, [43, 44, 7, 18]). To highlight one recent example, which is
important for the present paper, Dal Lago, Gavazzo and Levy have provided a uniform generalisation
of applicative bisimilarity to a functional programming language with effects [17].
A major goal of the present paper is to show that the logical approach to defining program
behaviour can also be adapted very naturally to the context of functional programming languages
with effects. In doing so, we establish that the corresponding behavioural equivalence coincides with
effectful applicative bisimilarity in the style of Dal Lago et al. [17].
More precisely, we consider a typed call-by-value functional programming language with algebraic
effects in the sense of Plotkin and Power [38]. Broadly speaking, effects are those aspects of com-
putation that involve a program interacting with its ‘environment’; for example: nondeterminism,
probabilistic choice (in both cases, the choice is deferred to the environment); input/output; muta-
ble store (the machine state is modified); control operations such as exceptions, jumps and handlers
(which interact with the continuation in the evaluation process); etc. Such general effects collectively
enjoy common properties identified in the work of Moggi on monads [27]. Among them, algebraic ef-
fects play a special role. They can be included in a programming language by adding effect-triggering
operations, whose ‘algebraic’ nature means that effects act independently of the continuation. From
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the aforementioned examples of effects, only jumps and handlers are non-algebraic. Thus the notion
of algebraic effect covers a broad range of effectful computational behaviour. Call-by-value functional
languages provide a natural context for exploring effectful programming. From a theoretical view-
point, other programming paradigms are subsumed; for example, imperative programs can be recast
as effectful functional ones. From a practical viewpoint, the combination of effects with call-by-value
leads to the natural programming style supported by impure functional languages such as OCaml.
In order to focus on the main contributions of the paper (the behavioural logic and its induced
behavioural equivalence), we instantiate “call-by-value functional language with algebraic effects” us-
ing a very simple language. Our language is a simply-typed λ-calculus with a base type of natural
numbers, general recursion, call-by-value function evaluation, and algebraic effects. That is, it is a
call-by-value version of PCF [36], extended with effects. A very similar language is used by Plotkin
and Power [38]; although, for technical convenience, we adopt an alternative (but equivalent) formu-
lation using fine-grained call-by-value [22]. The language is defined precisely in Section 2, using an
operational semantics that evaluates programs to effect trees [38, 14].
Section 3 introduces the behavioural logic. In our impure functional setting, the evaluation of a
program of type τ results in a computational process that may or may not invoke effects, and which
may or may not terminate with a return value of type τ . The key ingredient in our logic is an
effect-specific family O of modalities, where each modality o ∈ O converts a property φ of values of
some given type τ to a property o φ of general programs (called computations) of type τ . The idea
is that such modalities capture all relevant effect-specific behavioural properties of the effects under
consideration. For example, in the context of probabilistic computation, we have a modality P>q for
every rational q ∈ [0, 1), where the formula P>q φ is satisfied by a computation if the evaluation of the
computation has a probability greater than q of terminating with a return value satisfying φ.
A main contribution of the paper is to give a general framework for defining such effect modalities,
applicable across a wide range of algebraic effects. The technical setting for this is that we have a
signature Σ of effect operations, which determines the programming language, and a collection O of
modalities, which determines the behavioural logic. In order to specify the semantics of the logic, we
require each modality to be assigned a set of unit-type effect trees, which defines the meaning of the
modality. For example, the modality P>q is specified by the set of effect trees that have probability
greater than q of terminating if considered as a Markov chain. Several further examples and a detailed
general explanation are given in Section 3.
In Section 4, we consider the relation of behavioural equivalence between programs determined by
the logic. This equivalence directly relates to the notion of behaviour that is made explicit by the
modalities. A fundamental well-behavedness property that any reasonable program equivalence should
enjoy is that it should be a congruence with respect to the syntactic constructs of the programming
language. (If an equivalence is not a congruence then there are aspects of program behaviour that are
not distinguished by the equivalence but which can be separated within the programming language
itself.) The major result of the paper about the logically induced behavioural equivalence is that it is
indeed a congruence, as long as two conditions, openness and decomposability, hold of the collection O
of modalities (Theorem 1). These two conditions do indeed hold for the natural sets O of modalities
associated with the principal examples of algebraic effects.
As a second indication of the reasonableness of the logically defined behavioural equivalence, we
establish that it has an alternative characterisation as an effect-sensitive version of Abramsky’s notion
of applicative bisimilarity [2]. This is achieved, in Section 5, by using the modalities O in a logic-free
context to define a relation of applicative O-bisimilarity. The resulting equivalence relation is closely
related to the effect-sensitive version of bisimilarity developed by Dal Lago et al. [17] for an untyped
language with general algebraic effects. Our use of modalities as a uniform method for generating
the bisimilarity relation is, however, novel. Theorem 2 shows that applicative O-bisimilarity coincides
with the logically defined relation of behavioural equivalence.
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In addition to its conceptual value, establishing the coincidence of the logically defined equivalence
with applicative O-bisimilarity also serves an important technical purpose: this result is used crucially
in the proof of Theorem 1. We adapt the well-known proof method of Howe [11, 12] to show that
applicative O-bisimilarity is a congruence. By the coincidence theorem, this means that the logically
defined equivalence is indeed a congruence; establishing Theorem 1. Our adaptation of Howe’s method
is presented in Section 6. Although the argument is technically involved, a similar adaptation of
Howe’s method to a language with algebraic effects has been previously given by Dal Lago et al. [17].
Accordingly, this proof is not a main contribution of the present paper, and we give only an outline
argument in the main body of the paper, with details deferred to Appendix A.
In the discussion thus far we have ignored one nuance within the development of Sections 3–6.
In addition to working with the full behavioural logic, we also identify a positive fragment of the
logic, which omits negation. Whereas the full logic defines an equivalence relation that coincides with
applicative bisimilarity, the positive logic defines a preorder between programs that coincides with the
coarser relation of applicative similarity, from which it follows that the equivalence relation determined
by the positive logic coincides with mutual applicative similarity. In Section 7 we compare the above
equivalence relations and preorders, and we relate them to contextual preorder and equivalence, which
can also be naturally defined in terms of the set O of modalities. In general, applicative bisimilarity
is contained in mutual applicative similarity which is contained in contextual equivalence. For some
effects, however, these inclusions are strict. For example, as has been shown by Lassen [19] and
Ong [30], there are examples involving nondeterminism that separate the equivalences. For the sake
of completeness, we recall such separating examples in Section 7, with the novelty that we use the
logical characterisations of bisimilarity and mutual similarity as a tool for proving and disproving the
equivalences in question.
In cases in which the equivalences differ, there is a question of which (if any) of the equivalences
should be taken as being the most fundamental. In the literature, contextual equivalence is often
taken as the equivalence of choice for applicative languages. From this viewpoint, bisimilarity and
mutual similarity are considered important for providing sound (but incomplete) proof methods for
reasoning about contextual equivalence, which is the relation of ultimate interest. We would like
to argue instead that the logical viewpoint makes a strong case for considering bisimilarity as being
the primary equivalence. Every formula φ in the logic in this paper states a meaningful property of
program behaviour. It is a truism that, when two programs are not bisimilar, there is some property
of behaviour, expressible in the logic, that distinguishes them. If one takes the logic seriously, then the
desirable property that M |= φ and M ≡ N imply N |= φ holds only in the case that the equivalence
relation is bisimilarity, because of its characterisation as the logically induced equivalence.
The above (almost trivial) argument of course relies on accepting arbitrary formulas φ as expressing
behaviourally meaningful properties. Readers can read Section 3 and make up their own minds about
this. Alternatively, one might take a more pragmatic viewpoint. Another reason for accepting a
logic for expressing properties of programs is if it provides the expressivity needed to formulate proof
principles for reasoning about programs. In Section 9, we show that our logic does indeed support such
principles. Furthermore, they arise in the form of compositional proof rules that allow properties of a
compound program to be proved by establishing appropriate properties of its constituent subprograms.
In order to achieve this, we provide, in Section 8, a reformulation of our behavioural logic, which is
of interest in its own right. This reformulation enjoys the property that the syntax of the logic is
independent of the syntax of the programming language, which is not true of the logic of Section 3.
This property is appealing, as one would like to be able to specify behaviour without knowing the
syntax in which programs are written. More practically, the reformulation is used to formulate, in
Section 9, the compositional proof principles referred to above. There is one significant qualification
to add to this perspective. The infinitary propositional logics considered in the present paper are
by no means suitable for serving as practical logics for specification and verification. Nevertheless,
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we view these logics as relevant to the development of more practical non-propositional but finitary
logics, as they can potentially act as low-level ‘target’ logics into which high-level practical logics can
be ‘compiled’. We elaborate further on this point in Section 9. However, the development of practical
logics is left as a topic for future work.
Finally, in Section 10 we discuss other related and further work.
This paper is an extended and revised version of a conference paper [46], presented at the 27th
European Symposium on Programming (ESOP). One principal difference from the conference version
is that full proofs are included. Other extensions include: normal form results for the logic (Propo-
sitions 4.5 and 4.6); a significantly expanded presentation of the crucial decomposability properties in
Section 4; explicit descriptions of the O-relators determined by our running examples in Section 5; the
comparison between bisimilarity, similarity and contextual equivalence in Section 7; and the discussion
of compositional reasoning principles in Section 9.
2 A simple programming language
As motivated in the introduction, our chosen base language is a simply-typed call-by-value functional
language with general recursion and a ground type of natural numbers, to which we add (algebraic)
effect-triggering operations. This means that our language is a call-by-value variant of PCF [36],
extended with algebraic effects, resulting in a language similar to the one considered in Plotkin and
Power [38]. In order to simplify the technical treatment of the language, we present it in the style of
fine-grained call-by-value [22]. This means that we make a syntactic distinction between values and
computations, separating the static and dynamic aspects of the language respectively. Furthermore,
all sequencing of computations is performed using a single language construct, the let construct.
The resulting language is straightforwardly intertranslatable with the more traditional call-by-value
formulation. But the encapsulation of all sequencing within a single construct has the benefit of
avoiding redundancy in proofs.
Our types are just the simple types obtained by iterating the function type construction over two
base types: N of natural numbers, and also a unit type 1.
Types: τ, ρ ::= 1 | N | ρ→ τ
Contexts: Γ ::= ∅ | Γ, x : τ
As usual, term variables x are taken from a countably-infinite stock of such variables, and the context
Γ, x : τ can only be formed if the variable x does not already appear in Γ.
As discussed above, program terms are separated into two mutually defined but disjoint categories:
values and computations.
Values: V,W ::= ∗ | Z | S(V ) | λx : τ.M | x
Computations: M,N ::= V W | return V | let M ⇒ x in N | fix(V )
| case V in {Z ⇒M,S(x)⇒ N}
Here, ∗ is the unique value of the unit type. The values of the type of natural numbers are the numerals
represented using zero Z and successor S. The values of function types are the λ-abstractions. And
a variable x can be considered a value, because, under the call-by-value evaluation strategy of the
language, it can only be instantiated with a value.
The computations are: function application VW ; the computation that does nothing but return a
value V ; a let construct for sequencing; a fix construct for recursive definition1; and a case construct
that branches according to whether its natural-number argument is zero or positive. The computa-
tion ‘let M ⇒ x in N ’ implements sequencing in the following sense. First the computation M is
evaluated. Only in the case that the evaluation ofM terminates, with return value V , does the thread
1By defining fixV to be a computation which reduces to a lambda term, it holds that the only values of function
types are lambda terms.
5
Γ, x : τ ⊢ x : τ Γ ⊢ ∗ : 1 Γ ⊢ Z : N
Γ ⊢ V : N
Γ ⊢ S(V ) : N
Γ ⊢ V : τ
Γ ⊢ return(V ) : τ
Γ, x : τ ⊢M : ρ
Γ ⊢ (λx : τ.M) : τ → ρ
Γ ⊢ V : τ → ρ Γ ⊢W : τ
Γ ⊢ V W : ρ
Γ ⊢ V : (τ → ρ)→ (τ → ρ)
Γ ⊢ fix(V ) : τ → ρ
Γ ⊢ V : N Γ ⊢M : τ Γ, x : N ⊢ N : τ
Γ ⊢ case V of {Z ⇒M ;S(x)⇒ N} : τ
Γ ⊢M : τ Γ, x : τ ⊢ N : ρ
Γ ⊢ let M ⇒ x in N : ρ
σ : αn → α Γ ⊢Mi : τ
Γ ⊢ σ(M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) : τ
σ : αN → α Γ ⊢ V : N→ τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V ) : τ
σ : N× αn → α Γ ⊢ V : N Γ ⊢Mi : τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) : τ
σ : N× αN → α Γ ⊢ V : N Γ ⊢W : N→ τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;W ) : τ
Figure 1: Typing rules
of execution continue to N . In this case, the computation N [V/x] is evaluated, and its return value
(if any) is then returned as the result of the let computation.
To the pure functional language described above, we add effect operations. The collection of effect
operations is specified by a set Σ (the signature) of such operations, together with, for each σ ∈ Σ an
associated arity which takes one of the four forms below2
αn → α N× αn → α αN → α N× αN → α .
The notation here is chosen to be suggestive of the way in which such arities are used in the typing rules
of Fig. 1, viewing α as a type variable. Each of the forms of arity has an associated term constructor,
for building additional computation terms, with which we extend the above grammar for computation
terms.
Computations: M,N ::= · · · | σ(M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) | σ(V ;M0,M1, . . . ,Mn−1) | σ(V ) | σ(W ;V )
Motivating examples of effect operations and their computation terms can be found in Examples 0–5
below.
The typing rules for the language are given in Figure 1. Note that the choice of typing rule for an
effect operation σ ∈ Σ depends on its declared arity.
The terms of type τ are the values and computations generated by the constructors above. Every
term has a unique aspect as either a value or computation. We write Val(τ) and Com(τ) respectively
for closed values and computations. So the closed terms of τ are Term(τ) := Val(τ) ∪ Com(τ). For
n ∈ N a natural number, we write n for the numeral Sn(Z). Thus Val(N) = {n |n ∈ N}.
We now consider some illustrative signatures of computationally interesting effect operations, which
will be used as running examples throughout the paper. (We use the same examples as in Johann et
al. [14].)
Example 0 (Pure functional computation). This is the trivial case (from an effect point of view) in
which the signature Σ of effect operations is empty. The resulting language is a fine-grained call-by-
value variant of PCF [36].
2These four forms of arity suffice for the examples we consider. Similar choices were made in [14, 37]. Going beyond
such discrete arities is an interesting direction for future research; see Section 10.
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Example 1 (Error). We take a set of error labels E. For each e ∈ E there is an effect operation
raisee : α
0 → α which, when invoked by the computation raisee(), aborts evaluation and outputs ‘e’
as an error message.
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). There is a binary choice operation or : α2 → α which gives two
options for continuing the computation. The choice of continuation is under the control of some
external agent, which one may wish to model as being cooperative (angelic), antagonistic (demonic),
or neutral.
Example 3 (Probabilistic choice). Again there is a single binary choice operation p-or : α2 → α
which gives two options for continuing the computation. In this case, the choice of continuation is
probabilistic, with a 12 probability of either option being chosen. Other weighted probabilistic choices
can be programmed in terms of this fair choice operation.
Example 4 (Global store). We take a set of locations L for storing natural numbers. For each l ∈ L
we have lookupl : α
N → α and updatel : N×α→ α. The computation lookupl(V ) looks up the number
at location l and passes it as an argument to the function V , and updatel(n;M) stores n at l and then
continues with the computation M .
Example 5 (Input/output). Here we have two operations, read : αN → α which reads a number from
an input channel and passes it as the argument to a function, and write : N×α→ α which outputs a
number (the first argument) and then continues with the computation given as the second argument.
We next present an operational semantics for our language, under which a computation term
evaluates to an effect tree: essentially, a coinductively generated term using operations from Σ, and
with values and ⊥ (nontermination) as the generators. This idea appears in Plotkin and Power [38],
and our technical treatment follows the approach of Johann et al. [14], adapted to (fine-grained)
call-by-value.
We define a single-step reduction relation ֌ between configurations (S,M) consisting of a stack
S and a computation M . The computation M is the term under current evaluation. The stack
S represents a continuation computation awaiting the termination of M . First, we define a stack-
independent reduction relation on computation terms that do not involve let at the top level.
(λx : τ.M)V  M [V/x]
case Z of {Z ⇒M1;S(x)⇒M2}  M1
case S(V ) of {Z ⇒M1;S(x)⇒M2}  M2[V/x]
fix(F )  return λx : τ.let F (λy : τ.let fix F ⇒ z in zy)⇒ w in wx
The behaviour of let is implemented using a system of stacks where:
Stacks: S ::= id | S ◦ (let (−)⇒ x in M)
We write S{N} for the computation term obtained by ‘applying’ the stack S to N , defined by:
id {N} = N
(S ◦ (let (−)⇒ x in M)) {N} = S{let N ⇒ x in M}
We write Stack(τ, ρ) for the set of stacks S such that for any N ∈ Com(τ), it holds that S{N} is a
well-typed expression of type ρ. We define a reduction relation on pairs Stack(τ, ρ)×Com(τ) (denoted
(S1,M1)֌ (S2,M2)) by:
(S, let N ⇒ x in M) ֌ (S ◦ (let (−)⇒ x in M), N)
(S,R) ֌ (S,R′) if R R′
(S ◦ (let (−)⇒ x in M), return V ) ֌ (S,M [V/x])
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We define the notion of effect tree for an arbitrary set X, where X is thought of as a set of abstract
‘values’.
Definition 2.1. An effect tree (henceforth tree), over a set X, determined by a signature Σ of effect
operations, is a labelled and possibly infinite tree whose nodes have the possible forms:
1. A leaf node labelled with ⊥ (the symbol for nontermination).
2. A leaf node labelled with x where x ∈ X.
3. A node labelled σ with children t0, . . . , tn−1, when σ ∈ Σ has arity α
n → α.
4. A node labelled σ with children (ti)i∈N, when σ ∈ Σ has arity α
N → α.
5. A node labelled σm where m ∈ N with children t0, . . . , tn−1, when σ ∈ Σ has arity N× α
n → α.
6. A node labelled σm where m ∈ N with children (ti)i∈N, when σ ∈ Σ has arity N× α
N → α.
See Examples 2 and 4 later on in this section for examples of effect trees.
We write TX for the set of trees over X. We define a partial ordering on TX where t1 ≤ t2, if t1
can be obtained by pruning t2 by removing a possibly infinite number of subtrees of t2 and putting leaf
nodes labelled ⊥ in their place. This forms an ω-complete partial order, meaning that every ascending
sequence t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . has a least upper bound
⊔
n tn. Let Tree(τ) := T (Val(τ)), we will define a
reduction relation from computations to such trees of values.
Given f : X → Y and a tree t ∈ TX, we write t[x 7→ f(x)] ∈ TY or Tf(t) ∈ TY for the tree
whose leaves x ∈ X are renamed to f(x). We have a function µ : TTX → TX, which takes a tree r
of trees and flattens it to a tree µr ∈ TX, by taking the tree labelling each non-⊥ leaf of r to be the
subtree rooted at the corresponding node in µr. The function µ is the multiplication associated with
the monad structure of the T operation. The unit of the monad is the map η : X → TX which takes
an element x ∈ X and returns the leaf labelled x qua tree.
The operational mapping from a computation M ∈ Com(τ) to an effect tree is defined intuitively
as follows. Start evaluating the M in the empty stack id, until the evaluation process (which is
deterministic) terminates. If termination never happens the tree is ⊥. If the evaluation process
terminates at a configuration of the form (id, return V ) then the tree is the leaf V . Otherwise
the evaluation process can only terminate at a configuration of the form (S, σ(. . . )) for some effect
operation σ ∈ Σ. In this case, create an internal node in the tree of the appropriate kind (depending
on σ) and continue generating each child tree of this node by repeating the above process by evaluating
an appropriate continuation computation, starting from a configuration with the current stack S.
The following (somewhat technical) definition formalises the idea outlined above in a mathemati-
cally concise way. We define a family of maps |−,−|(−) : Stack(τ, ρ)×Com(τ)×N→ Tree(ρ) indexed
over τ and ρ by:
|S,M |0 = ⊥
|S,M |n+1 =

V if S = id ∧M = return V
|S′,M ′|n if (S,M)֌ (S
′,M ′)
σ(|S,M0|n, . . . , |S,Mm−1|n) σ :αm→α,M=σ(M0, . . . ,Mm−1)
σ(|S, V 0|n, |S, V 1|n, . . . ) σ :α
N→α,M =σ(V )
σk(|S,M0|n, . . . , |S,Mm−1|n) σ :N×αm→α,M=σ(k;M0, . . . ,Mm−1)
σk(|S, V 0|n, |S, V 1|n, . . . ) σ :N×αN→α,M=σ(k;V )
⊥ otherwise
It follows that |S,M |n ≤ |S,M |n+1 in the given ordering on trees. We write
| − |(−) : Com(τ)× N→ Tree(τ)
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for the function defined by |M |n = |id,M |n. Using this we can give the operational interpretation of
computation terms as effect trees by defining | − | : Com(τ)→ Tree(τ) by
|M | :=
⊔
n
|M |n .
We illustrate the above definitions with a couple of examples of effect computations and their
corresponding effect trees.
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). Nondeterministically generate a natural number:
?N := let fix(λx : 1→ N. or(λy : 1. Z , λy : 1. let xy ⇒ z in S(z)))⇒ w in w∗
or
⑦⑦
⑦⑦
⑦
❇❇
❇❇
❇
0 or
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
❄❄
❄❄
❄❄
|?N | = 1 or
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
⑧⑧
2
Example 4 (Global store). Save and load a value, returning its successor:
V := λy : N.updatel(y; lookupl(λx : N. return(S(x)))) : N → N
updatel(1)
|V 1| = lookupl
1
0❦❦❦❦❦❦
❦❦❦❦❦❦
2
1rrr
rrr
3
2
. . . n+ 1
n❚❚❚❚❚❚
❚❚❚❚❚❚
In the second example above, we see that the resulting tree exhibits redundancies with respect to
the expected model of computation with global store. Since the updatel operation sets the value of
location l to 1, the ensuing lookupl operation will retrieve the value 1, and so execution will proceed
down the branch labelled 1 resulting in the return value 2. The other infinitely many leaves of the
tree are redundant. The issue here is that the operational semantics of the language has been defined
independently of any implementation model for the effect operations. An effect tree provides a normal
form that records in its nodes all effect operations that may potentially be performed during execution,
and the dependencies between them. But nothing is stated about which effect operations will actually
be performed in practice, and what effect they have if invoked. It is precisely this lack of specificity
that allows the operational semantics to be defined in a uniform way depending only on the signature
of effect operations and their arities.
In order to be able to reason about programs with effects (for example, to establish properties
of or equivalences between them), it is necessary to supply the missing information about how effect
operations behave when executed. As motivated in the introduction, we now proceed to do this by
introducing a behavioural logic for expressing behavioural properties of our language.
3 Behavioural logic and modalities
The goal of this section is to motivate and formulate a logic for expressing behavioural properties of
programs. In our language, program means (well-typed) term, and we shall be interested both in
properties of computations and in properties of values. Accordingly, we define a logic that contains
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both value formulas and computation formulas. We shall use lower case Greek letters φ,ψ, . . . for the
former, and upper case Greek letters Φ,Ψ, . . . for the latter. Our logic will thus have two satisfaction
relations
V |= φ M |= Φ
which respectively assert that “value V enjoys the value property expressed by φ” and “computation
M enjoys the computation property expressed by Φ”.
In order to motivate the detailed formulation of the logic, it is useful to identify criteria that will
guide the design.
(C1) The logic should express only ‘behaviourally meaningful’ properties of programs. This guides us
to build the logic upon primitive notions that have a direct behavioural interpretation according
to a natural understanding of program behaviour.
(C2) The logic should be as expressive as possible within the constraints imposed by criterion (C1).
For every type τ , we define a collection VF (τ) of value formulas, and a collection CF (τ) of
computation formulas, as motivated above.
Since boolean logical connectives say nothing themselves about computational behaviour, it is a
reasonable general principle that ‘behavioural properties’ should be closed under such connectives.
Thus, in keeping with criterion (C2), which asks for maximal expressivity, we close each set CF (τ)
and VF (τ), of computation and value formulas, under infinitary propositional logic.
In addition to closure under infinitary propositional logic, each set VF (τ) contains a collection of
basic value formulas, from which compound formulas are constructed using (infinitary) propositional
connectives.3 The choice of basic formulas depends on the type τ .
In the case of the natural numbers type, we include a basic value formula {n} ∈ VF (N), for every
n ∈ N. The semantics of this formula are given by:
V |= {n} ⇔ V = n .
By the closure of VF (N) under infinitary disjunctions, every subset of N can be represented by some
value formula. Moreover, since a general value formula in VF (N) is an infinitary boolean combination
of basic formulas of the form {n}, every value formula corresponds to a subset of N.
For the unit type, we do not require any basic value formulas. The unit type has only one value,
∗. The two subsets of this singleton set of values are defined by the formulas ⊥ (‘falsum’, given as an
empty disjunction), and ⊤ (the truth constant, given as an empty conjunction).
For a function type τ → ρ, we want each basic formula to express a fundamental behavioural
constraint on values (i.e., λ-abstractions) W of type τ → ρ. In keeping with the applicative nature of
functional programming, the only way in which a λ-abstraction can be used to generate behaviour is
to apply it to an argument of type τ , which, because we are in a call-by-value setting, must be a value
V . The application ofW to V results in a computationWV of type ρ, whose properties can be probed
using computation formulas in CF (ρ). Based on this, for every value V ∈ Val(τ) and computation
formula Φ ∈ CF (ρ), we include a basic value formula (V 7→ Φ) ∈ VF (τ → ρ) with the semantics:
W |= (V 7→ Φ) ⇔ WV |= Φ .
Using this simple construct, based on application to a single argument V , other natural mechanisms for
expressing properties of λ-abstractions are definable, using infinitary propositional logic. For example,
given φ ∈ VF (τ) and Ψ ∈ CF (ρ), the definition
(φ 7→ Ψ) :=
∧
{(V 7→ Ψ) | V ∈ Val(τ), V |= φ} (1)
3We call such formulas basic rather than atomic because they include formulas such as (V 7→ Φ), discussed below,
which are built from other formulas.
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defines a formula whose derived semantics is
W |= (φ 7→ Ψ) ⇔ ∀V ∈Val(τ), V |= φ implies WV |= Ψ . (2)
In Section 8, we shall consider the possibility of changing the basic value formulas in VF (τ → ρ) to
formulas (φ 7→ Ψ).
It remains to explain how the basic computation formulas in CF (τ) are formed. For this we require
a given set O of modalities, which depends on the algebraic effects contained in the language. The
basic computation formulas in CF (τ) then have the form o φ, where o ∈ O is one of the available
modalities, and φ is a value formula in VF (τ). Thus a modality lifts properties of values of type τ to
properties of computations of type τ .
In order to give semantics to computation formulas o φ, we need a general theory of the kind of
modality under consideration. This is one of the main contributions of the paper. Before presenting
the general theory, we first consider motivating examples, using our running examples of algebraic
effects.
Example 0 (Pure functional computation). Define O = {↓}. Here the single modality ↓ is the
termination modality : ↓φ asserts that a computation terminates with a return value V satisfying φ.
This is formalised using effect trees:
M |= ↓φ ⇔ |M | is a leaf V and V |= φ .
Note that, in the case of pure functional computation, all trees are leaves: either value leaves V , or
nontermination leaves ⊥.
Example 1 (Error). Define O = {↓} ∪ {Ee | e ∈ E}. The semantics of the termination modality ↓ is
defined as above. The error modality Ee flags error e:
M |= Eeφ ⇔ |M | is a node labelled with raisee .
(Because raisee is an operation of arity 0, a raisee node in a tree has 0 children.) Note that the
semantics of Eeφ makes no reference to φ. Indeed it would be natural to consider Ee as a basic
computation formula in its own right, which could be done by introducing a notion of 0-argument
modality, and considering Ee as such. In this paper, however, we keep the treatment uniform by
always considering modalities as unary operations, with natural 0-argument modalities subsumed as
unary modalities with a redundant argument.
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). Define O = {♦, } with:
M |= ♦φ ⇔ |M | has some leaf V such that V |= φ
M |= φ ⇔ |M | has finite height and every leaf is a value V s.t. V |= φ .
Including both modalities amounts to a neutral view of nondeterminism. In the case of angelic
nondeterminism, one would include just the ♦ modality; in that of demonic nondeterminism, just the
 modality. Because of the way the semantic definitions interact with termination, the modalities 
and ♦ are not De Morgan duals. Indeed, each of the three possibilities {♦, }, {♦}, {} for O leads
to a logic with a different expressivity.
Example 3 (Probabilistic choice). Define O = {P>q | q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q < 1} with:
M |= P>q φ ⇔ P(|M | terminates with a value in {V | V |= φ}) > q ,
where the probability on the right is the probability that a run through the tree |M |, starting at
the root, and making an independent fair probabilistic choice at each branching node, terminates at
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a value node with a value V in the set {V | V |= φ}. We observe that the restriction to rational
thresholds q is immaterial, as, for any real r with 0 ≤ r < 1, we can define:
P>r φ :=
∨
{P>q φ | q ∈ Q, r < q < 1} .
Similarly, we can define non-strict threshold modalities, for 0 < r ≤ 1, by:
P≥r φ :=
∧
{P>q φ | q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q < r} .
Also, we can exploit negation to define modalities expressing strict and non-strict upper bounds on
probabilities. Notwithstanding the definability of non-strict and upper-bound thresholds, we shall see
later that it is important that we include only strict lower-bound modalities in our set O of primitive
modalities.
Example 4 (Global store). Given the set of locations L, we define the set of states by State := NL.
The modalities are O = {(s֌ s′) | s, s′ ∈ State}, where informally:
M |= (s֌ s′)φ ⇔ the execution of M , starting in state s, terminates in
final state s′ with return value V such that V |= φ .
We make the above definition precise using the effect tree of M . Define
exec : TX × State→ X × State ,
for any set X, to be the least partial function satisfying:
exec(t, s) =

(x, s) if t is a leaf labelled with x ∈ X
exec(ts(l), s) if t = lookupl(t0, t1, · · · ) and exec(ts(l), s) is defined
exec(t′, s[l := n]) if t = updatel,n(t
′) and exec(t′, s[l := n]) is defined ,
where s[l := n] is the evident modification of state s. Intuitively, exec(t, s) defines the result of “exe-
cuting” the tree of commands in effect tree t starting in state s, whenever this execution terminates.
In terms of operational semantics, it can be viewed as defining a ‘big-step’ semantics for effect trees
(in the signature of global store). We can now define the semantics of the (s֌ s′) modality formally:
M |= (s֌ s′)φ ⇔ exec(|M |, s) = (V, s′) where V |= φ .
In Section 9, we show an example of how to encode Hoare Logic in the above logic.
Example 5 (Input/output). Define an i/o-trace to be a word w over the alphabet
{?n | n ∈ N} ∪ {!n | n ∈ N} .
The idea is that such a word represents an input/output sequence, where ?n means the number n is
given in response to an input prompt, and !n means that the program outputs n. Define the set of
modalities
O = {〈w〉↓, 〈w〉... | w an i/o-trace} .
The intuitive semantics of these modalities is as follows.
M |= 〈w〉↓φ ⇔ w is a complete i/o-trace for the execution of M
resulting in termination with V s.t. V |= φ .
M |= 〈w〉... φ ⇔ w is an initial i/o-trace for the execution of M .
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n ∈ N
{n} ∈ VF (N)
(1)
V : τ Φ ∈ CF (ρ)
(V 7→ Φ) ∈ VF (τ → ρ)
(2)
φ ∈ VF (τ) o ∈ O
o φ ∈ CF (τ)
(3)
φ : I → VF (τ)∨
I φ ∈ VF (τ)
(4)
φ : I → VF (τ)∧
I φ ∈ VF (τ)
(5)
φ ∈ VF (τ)
¬φ ∈ VF (τ)
(6)
Φ : I → CF (τ)∨
I Φ ∈ CF (τ)
(7)
Φ : I → CF (τ)∧
I Φ ∈ CF (τ)
(8)
Φ ∈ CF (τ)
¬Φ ∈ CF (τ)
(9)
Figure 2: The logic V
In order to define the semantics of formulas precisely, we first define relations t |= 〈w〉↓P and t |= 〈w〉...,
between t ∈ TX and P ⊆ X, by induction on words. (Note that we are overloading the |= symbol.)
In the following, we write ε for the empty word, and we use textual juxtaposition for concatenation
of words.
t |= 〈ε〉↓P ⇔ t is a leaf x and x ∈ P
t |= 〈(?n)w〉↓P ⇔ t = read(t0, t1, . . . ) and tn |= 〈w〉↓P
t |= 〈(!n)w〉↓P ⇔ t = writen(t
′) and t′ |= 〈w〉↓P
t |= 〈ε〉... ⇔ true
t |= 〈(?n)w〉... ⇔ t = read(t0, t1, . . . ) and tn |= 〈w〉...
t |= 〈(!n)w〉... ⇔ t = writen(t
′) and t′ |= 〈w〉...
The formal semantics of modalities is now easily defined by:
M |= 〈w〉↓ φ ⇔ |M | |= 〈w〉↓ {V | V |= φ}
M |= 〈w〉... φ ⇔ |M | |= 〈w〉... .
Note that, as in Example 1, the formula argument of the 〈w〉... modality is redundant. Also, note that
our modalities for input/output could naturally be formed by combining the termination modality ↓,
which lifts value formulas to computation formulas, with sequences of atomic modalities 〈?n〉 and 〈!n〉
acting directly on computation formulas. In this paper, we do not include such modalities, acting on
computation formulas, in our general theory. But this is a natural avenue for future consideration.
We now give a formal treatment of the logic and its semantics, in full generality. We assume a
signature Σ of effect operations, as in Section 2. We also assume a given set O, whose elements we
call modalities.
We call our main behavioural logic V, where the letter V is chosen as a reference to the fact that
the basic formula at function type specifies function behaviour on individual value arguments V .
Definition 3.1 (The logic V). The classes VF (τ) and CF (τ) of value and computation formulas, for
each type τ , are mutually inductively defined by the rules in Fig. 2. In this, I can be instantiated to
any set, allowing for arbitrary conjunctions and disjunctions. When I is ∅, we get the special formulas
⊤ =
∧
∅ and ⊥ =
∨
∅. The use of arbitrary index sets means that formulas, as defined, form a proper
class. However, we shall see below that countable index sets suffice.
In order to specify the semantics of modal formulas, we require a connection between modalities
and effect trees, which is given by an interpretation function
J−K : O → P(T1) .
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That is, every modality o ∈ O is mapped to a subset JoK ⊆ T1 of unit-type effect trees. Given a subset
P ⊆ X (e.g. given by a formula) and a tree t ∈ TX we can define a unit-type tree t[∈ P ] ∈ T1 as the
tree created by replacing the leaves of t that belong to P by ∗ and the others by ⊥. In the case that
P is the subset {V | V |= φ} specified by a formula φ ∈ VF (τ), we also write t[ |= φ] for t[∈ P ].
We now define the two satisfaction relations |= ⊆ Val(τ) × VF (τ) and |= ⊆ Com(τ) × CF (τ),
mutually inductively, where for the basic formulas we have:
W |= {n} ⇔ W = n
W |= (V 7→ Φ) ⇔ WV |= Φ
M |= o φ ⇔ |M | [ |= φ] ∈ JoK ,
and for the other formulas we have:
W |=
∨
I
φ ⇔ ∃i ∈ I,W |= φi
W |=
∧
I
φ ⇔ ∀i ∈ I,W |= φi
W |= ¬φ ⇔ ¬(W |= φ) .
We remark that all conjunctions and disjunctions are semantically equivalent to countable ones, be-
cause value and computation formulas are interpreted over sets of terms, Val(τ) and Com(τ), which
are countable.
The lemma below is standard. It states that every formula in infinitary propositional logic can be
written in infinitary disjunctive normal form. (It can also be written in infinitary conjunctive normal
form.)
Lemma 3.2. Each formula φ ∈ V (value or computation) is equivalent to a formula of the form∨
I
∧
J ψ where for each i ∈ I and j ∈ Ji the formula ψi,j is either a basic formula or the negation of
a basic formula.
We omit the proof, which is both routine and standard.
We end this section by revisiting our running examples, and observing, in each case, that the
example modalities presented above are all specified by suitable interpretation functions J−K : O →
P(T1).
Example 0 (Pure functional computation). We have O = {↓}. Define:
J↓K = { ∗ } (where ∗ is the tree with single node ∗) .
Example 1 (Error). We have O = {↓} ∪ {Ee | e ∈ E}. Define:
JEeK = { raisee } .
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). We have O = {♦, }. Define:
J♦K = {t | t has some ∗ leaf}
JK = {t | t is finite and every leaf is a ∗} .
Example 3 (Probabilistic choice). O = {P>q | q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q < 1}. Define:
JP>qK = {t | P( t terminates with a ∗ leaf ) > q} .
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Example 4 (Global store). O = {(s֌ s′) | s, s′ ∈ State}. Define:
J(s֌ s′)K = {t | exec(t, s) = (∗, s′)} .
Example 5 (Input/output). O = {〈w〉↓, 〈w〉... | w an i/o-trace}. Define:
J〈w〉↓ K = {t | t |= 〈w〉↓ {∗} }
J〈w〉... K = {t | t |= 〈w〉... } .
In this section we have defined our logic expressing behavioural properties. We next proceed to
derive the induced notion of behavioural equivalence between programs, as motivated in Section 1.
4 Behavioural equivalence
The goal of this section is to precisely formulate our main theorem: under suitable conditions, the
behavioural equivalence determined by the logic V of Section 3 is a congruence. In addition, we shall
obtain a similar result for a coarser behavioural preorder determined by a natural positive fragment
of V, which we call V+. In addition to being natural in its own right, the preorder induced by the
positive fragment V+ turns out to be an indispensable technical tool for establishing properties of the
behavioural equivalence induced by the full logic V.
Definition 4.1 (The logic V+). The logic V+ is the fragment of V consisting of those formulas in
VF (τ) and CF (τ) that do not contain negation. It is inductively defined using rules 1-5, 7 and 8 from
Fig. 2.
Whenever we have a logic L whose value and computation formulas are given as subcollections
VFL(τ) ⊆ VF (τ) and CFL(τ) ⊆ CF (τ), then L determines a preorder (and hence also an equiv-
alence relation) between terms of the same type and aspect.
Definition 4.2 (Logical preorder and equivalence). Given a fragment L of V, we define the logical
preorder ⊑L, between well-typed terms of the same type and aspect, by:
V ⊑L W ⇔ ∀φ ∈ VFL(τ), V |= φ ⇒ W |= φ
M ⊑L N ⇔ ∀Φ ∈ CFL(τ), M |= Φ ⇒ N |= Φ
The logical equivalence ≡L on terms is the equivalence relation induced by the preorder (the intersec-
tion of ⊑L and its converse).
In the case that formulas in L are closed under negation, the preorder ⊑L is already an equivalence
relation, and hence coincides with ≡L. Thus we shall only refer specifically to the preorder ⊑L, for
fragments, such as V+, that are not closed under negation.
The two main relations of interest to us in this paper are the primary relations determined by V
and V+: full behavioural equivalence ≡V ; and the positive behavioural preorder ⊑V+ (which induces
positive behavioural equivalence ≡V+). Since V
+ is a subset of V, it is apparent that ≡V is finer than
≡V+, as it considers more behavioural properties which could distinguish terms. For the same reason,
it holds that ⊑V ⊆ ⊑V+.
Before formulating the required notions to prove congruence of the behavioural equivalences, we
shall make some observations about the preorders and discuss a possible simplification of the logic
(Proposition 4.5).
Lemma 4.3. For any V0, V1 ∈ Val(ρ→ τ), we have V0 ⊑V+ V1 if and only if:
∀W ∈ Val(ρ), ∀Ψ ∈ CFV+(τ), V0 |= (W 7→ Ψ) implies V1 |= (W 7→ Ψ) .
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Lemma 4.4. For any M0,M1 ∈ Com(τ), we have M0 ⊑V+ M1 if and only if:
∀o ∈ O, ∀φ ∈ VFV+(τ), M0 |= o φ impliesM1 |= o φ .
Both these lemmas are a consequence of the fact that satisfaction of conjunctions and disjunctions are
completely determined by satisfaction of the formulas over which the connectives are taken. As such,
the logical preorder is completely determined by satisfaction of basic formulas. Similar characterisa-
tions, but replacing ‘implies’ and V+ with ‘if and only if’ and V respectively, hold for the behavioural
equivalence ≡V .
Proposition 4.5. Let K be the fragment of V inductively defined by rules 1 to 6 from Fig. 2
(so computation formulas are not closed under propositional connectives), then the induced logical
equivalence ≡K is the same as ≡V .
Proof. We prove that any value formula φ ∈ V is equivalent to a value formula φ′ from K. We do this
by induction on types. For value formulas of natural numbers type, note that VFV(N) = VFK(N), so
the statement is trivially true by taking φ′ := φ.
For value formulas of function type, assume φ is a basic formula V 7→ Φ, where by Lemma 3.2 we
may assume w.l.o.g. that Φ is a disjunction over conjunctions over formulas Ψ of the form oψ or ¬oψ.
We can now use the equivalences (V 7→
∨
I
∧
J Ψ) ≡
∨
I
∧
J(V 7→ Ψ) and (V 7→ ¬oψ) ≡ ¬(V 7→ oψ) to
construct a formula φ′ ∈ K equivalent to φ, using the induction hypothesis to replace each occurrence
of oψ with oψ′ where ψ′ ∈ K is equivalent to ψ. In the case that φ is not a basic formula, we can
do an induction on its structure to find the desired φ′, where (
∨
I ψ)
′ :=
∨
I ψ
′, (
∧
I ψ)
′ :=
∧
I ψ
′,
(¬ψ)′ := ¬(ψ′), and basic formulas are handled as above.
So every value formula has an equivalent value formula in K, so the logical preorder on value terms
remains unchanged. To see that the logical equivalence on computation terms remains unchanged,
simply use Lemma 4.4.
Altering the proof slightly, we can derive a similar result for the positive logic.
Proposition 4.6. Let K+ be the fragment of V+ defined by rules 1 to 5 from Fig. 2 (so computation
formulas are not closed under propositional connectives), then the induced logical preorder ⊑K+ is the
same as ⊑V+.
We next formulate the appropriate technical notion of (pre)congruence4 to apply to the relations
≡V and ⊑V+. These two preorders are examples of well-typed relations on closed terms. Any such
relation can be extended to a relation on open terms in the following way. Given a well-typed relationR
on closed terms, we define the open extension R◦ where Γ ⊢M R◦N : τ precisely when, for every well-
typed vector of closed values
−→
V : Γ, it holds that M [
−→
V ]RN [
−→
V ]. The correct notion of precongruence
for a well-typed preorder on closed terms, is to ask for its open extension to be compatible in the sense
of the definition below; see, e.g., Lassen and Pitts [19, 35] for further explanation.
Definition 4.7 (Compatibility). A well-typed open relation R is said to be compatible if it is closed
under the rules in Fig. 3.
We now state our main congruence result, although we have not yet defined the conditions it
depends upon.
Theorem 1. If O is a decomposable set of Scott-open modalities then the open extensions of ≡V
and ⊑V+ are both compatible. (It is an immediate consequence that the open extension of ≡V+ is
also compatible.)
4A precongruence is a preorder enjoying the properties of a congruence relation apart from symmetry.
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Γ, x : τ ⊢ xRx : τ Γ ⊢ ZRZ : N
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : N
Γ ⊢ S(V )RS(V ′) : N
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : τ
Γ ⊢ return(V )R return(V ′) : τ
Γ, x : τ ⊢M RM ′ : ρ
Γ ⊢ (λx : τ.M)R (λx : τ.M ′) : τ → ρ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : τ → ρ Γ ⊢W RW ′ : τ
Γ ⊢ (V W )R (V ′W ′) : ρ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : (τ → ρ)→ (τ → ρ)
Γ ⊢ fix(V )Rfix(V ′) : τ → ρ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : N Γ ⊢M RM ′ : τ Γ, x : N ⊢ N RN ′ : τ
Γ ⊢ case V of {Z ⇒M ;S(x)⇒ N}R case V ′ of {Z ⇒M ′;S(x)⇒ N ′} : τ
Γ ⊢M RM ′ : τ Γ, x : τ ⊢ N RN ′ : ρ
Γ ⊢ let M ⇒ x in N R let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′ : ρ
Γ ⊢MiRM
′
i : τ
Γ ⊢ σ(M0,M1, ...)Rσ(M ′0,M
′
1, ...) : τ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : N Γ ⊢MiRM
′
i : τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;M0,M1, ...)Rσ(V ′;M ′0,M
′
1, ...) : τ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : N→ τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V )Rσ(V ′) : τ
Γ ⊢ V RV ′ : N Γ ⊢W RW ′ : N→ τ
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;W )Rσ(V ′;W ′) : τ
Figure 3: Rules for compatibility
The Scott-openness condition refers to the Scott topology on T1, which can be divided into two
properties.
Definition 4.8. We say that o ∈ O is upwards closed if JoK is an upwards closed subset of T1; i.e., if
t ∈ JoK implies t′ ∈ JoK whenever t ≤ t′.
Definition 4.9. The modality o ∈ O is Scott-open if JoK is an open set in the Scott topology on T1;
i.e., JoK is upwards closed and, whenever t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . is an ascending chain in T1 with supremum
⊔iti ∈ JoK, we have tn ∈ JoK for some n.
We now turn to the decomposability condition in Theorem 1, which will eventually be given in
Definition 4.15 below, following the introduction of certain auxiliary relations that are required for
the definition. Because the formulation is unavoidably technical, we first give some motivation for
where we are heading.
The main purpose of the decomposability property is to enable us to prove that the positive be-
havioural preorder is preserved by the let term constructor. (This motivation will eventually manifest
itself in case 5 in the proof of Lemma 6.4 in Appendix A.) The particular technical challenge presented
by let is that it sequences effects. Semantically, the operation of effect sequencing is distilled into
the monad multiplication map µ : TTX → TX defined in Section 2. Accordingly, we formulate the
required notion of decomposability as a property of µ. It turns out that we need only consider µ in
the case that X is the singleton set {∗}. Thus decomposability will involve trees of unit type, that is
trees in T1, as well as double trees, that is trees in TT1. We shall define it as the property that the
monad multiplication µ is order-preserving with respect to preorders 2 and 4 defined on double and
single trees respectively.
The relation 4 on T1 is a natural extension of the positive behavioural preorder ⊑V+, at unit type,
from a relation on computation terms to a relation 4 on arbitrary effect trees. To accommodate this
perspective, we introduce a new notation, allowing us to apply a modality o to an arbitrary subset of
a set X of values: for A ⊆ X and o ∈ O we define
oX(A) = {t ∈ TX | t[∈ A] ∈ JoK} ⊆ TX .
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We will often write o(A) instead of oX(A) when X is clear from the context. For instance, if t ∈ TX
then t ∈ o(A) means t ∈ oX(A). One case of particular interest is when A = X = {∗}, for which
we note that o({∗}) = JoK. Using the extended interpretation of modalities, we similarly extend the
satisfaction relation of type 1 positive computation formulas, from computation terms of type 1 to
arbitrary T1 computation trees.5 For each Φ ∈ CFV+ (1), we define its denotation JΦK ⊆ T1 over
unit type trees inductively, according to the following rules:6
Jo(⊤)K := o({∗}), Jo(⊥)K := o(∅),r∨
X
z
:=
⋃
{JΦK | Φ ∈ X}, r∧Xz :=⋂{JΦK | Φ ∈ X}.
The above definition can be seen as an extension of the satisfaction relation on unit type computation
terms, since for any computation term M : 1 and formula Φ ∈ CFV+(1) it holds that M |= Φ ⇔
|M | ∈ JΦK.
We can now define the required preorder between arbitrary trees of type 1.
Definition 4.10. We define the preorder 4 on T1 by: for any two trees t, t′ ∈ T1,
t 4 t′ :⇐⇒ ∀Φ ∈ CFV+ (1), t ∈ JΦK ⇒ t′ ∈ JΦK.
It is immediate that 4 is a conservative extension of the positive behavioural preorder on compu-
tation terms of type 1 in the following sense:
Proposition 4.11. For any M,N ∈ Com(1), it holds that |M | 4 |N | if and only if M ⊑V+ N .
We give some alternative characterisations of 4.
Proposition 4.12. For any t, t′ ∈ T1, the following three statements are equivalent:
1. t 4 t′.
2. (t 4 t′) ∧ (t[∈ ∅] 4 t′[∈ ∅]).
3. ∀o ∈ O, (t ∈ o({∗})⇒ t′ ∈ o({∗})) ∧ (t ∈ o(∅)⇒ t′ ∈ o(∅)).
Proof. The equivalence (1)⇔ (3) follows from a straightforward induction on the structure of positive
unit type computation formulas. Using the previous equivalence, the equivalence (1) ⇔ (2) follows
from the fact that t[∈ ∅] ∈ o({∗}) ⇔ t ∈ o(∅).
In the examples given in this paper, the preorder can be characterised in a simpler way, where
t 4 t′ ⇐⇒ ∀o ∈ O, t ∈ JoK ⇒ t′ ∈ JoK. (3)
This is a consequence of the fact that each modality o given in the examples satisfy one of the two
following properties:
(i) ∀t ∈ T1, t /∈ o(∅). The modalities with this property are: ↓,♦,,P>q, (s֌ s
′), and 〈w〉↓.
(ii) ∀t ∈ T1, t ∈ o({∗})⇔ t ∈ o(∅). The modalities with this property are Ee and 〈w〉....
There do however exist sets of Scott open modalities for which the characterisation of 4 via (3) does
not hold. For example, for Σ = {raise : α0 → α} and O = {o} where JoK = {∗, raise}.
We next define the relation 2 on double trees TT1.
5In general, there are uncountably many trees, whereas there are only countably many computation terms.
6For a set X of formulas, we denote
∨
X and
∧
X for respectively the disjunction and conjunction over X.
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Definition 4.13. We define the preorder 2 on TT1 by: for any two double trees r, r′ ∈ TT1,
r 2 r′ :⇐⇒ ∀o ∈ O,∀Φ ∈ CFV+ (1), r ∈ o(JΦK)⇒ r′ ∈ o(JΦK).
We give some characterisations of 2. These use the notion of right-set, that is; for any relation
R ⊆ X × Y and subset A ⊆ X, we write R↑A := {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ A, xR y} for the right-set of A under
the relation R.
Lemma 4.14. If O is a set of upwards-closed modalities, then for all r, r′ ∈ TT1, the following are
equivalent:
1. r 2 r′.
2. ∀A ⊆ T1, r[∈ A] 4 r′[∈ (4↑A)].
3. ∀o ∈ O,∀A ⊆ T1, r ∈ o(A)⇒ r′ ∈ o(4↑A).
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2) Let r[∈ A] ∈ o({∗}), then since A ⊆ (4↑A) and o is upwards closed, r[∈ (4↑A)] ∈
o({∗}), which means r ∈ o(4↑A). Let ΦA :=
∨
t∈A((
∧
o∈O,t∈o({∗}) o(⊤)) ∧ (
∧
o∈O,t∈o(∅) o(⊥))), thenJΦAK = (4↑A) as ΦA perfectly replicates the condition of membership in 4↑A. So by (1) it holds
that r′ ∈ o(4↑A), hence r′[∈ (4↑A)] ∈ o({∗}). If r[∈ A] ∈ o(∅), then r ∈ o(∅) hence r′ ∈ o(∅) (since
(
∨
∅) ∈ CFV+ (1) and J∨ ∅K = ∅), so r′[∈ (4↑A)] ∈ o(∅). We can conclude that r[∈ A] 4 r′[∈ (4↑A)].
(2)⇒ (3) If r[∈ A] 4 r′[∈ (4↑A)], then for any o ∈ O it holds that r[∈ A] ∈ o({∗}) ⇒ r′[∈ 4↑A] ∈
o({∗}), which is identical to the statement r ∈ o(A)⇒ r′ ∈ o(4↑A).
(3) ⇒ (1) If r ∈ o(JΦK) with Φ ∈ CFV+ (1), then by (3) it holds that r′ ∈ o(4↑JΦK). By
the definition of 4 it holds that (4↑JΦK) ⊆ JΦK, and since 4 is reflexive JΦK ⊆ (4↑JΦK). Hence
(4↑JΦK) = JΦK and we conclude that r′ ∈ o(JΦK).
We can now finally define the promised notion of decomposability.
Definition 4.15 (Decomposability). We say that O is decomposable if, for all double trees r, r′ ∈ TT1,
r 2 r′ implies µr 4 µr′.
Since decomposability is such a technical notion, we give two lemmas providing alternative charac-
terisations of it. The first gives a reformulation that is immediate in the case of our examples, where
the statement t 4 t′ can be simplified via (3). The general case, however, requires a rather technical
proof.
Lemma 4.16. A set of upwards-closed modalities O is decomposable if and only if for all r, r′ ∈ TT1,
if r 2 r′, then ∀o ∈ O, µr ∈ o({∗})⇒ µr′ ∈ o({∗}).
Proof. We use the equivalences from Proposition 4.12.
(⇒) The result follows by observing that µr 4 µr′ implies ∀o ∈ O, µr ∈ o({∗}) ⇒ µr′ ∈ o({∗}).
(⇐) Assume: (I) ∀r, r′ ∈ TT1, r 2 r′ ⇒ (∀o ∈ O, µr ∈ o({∗}) ⇒ µr′ ∈ o({∗})).
Take some r, r′ ∈ TT1, and suppose that r 2 r′, hence with Lemma 4.14 it holds that:
(II) ∀o ∈ O, A ⊆ T1, r ∈ o(A)⇒ r′ ∈ o(4↑A).
We need to prove that µr 4 µr′. By (I) we derive that ∀o ∈ O, µr ∈ o({∗})⇒ µr′ ∈ o({∗}). To prove
µr 4 µr′ we need only prove ∀o ∈ O, µr ∈ o(∅)⇒ µr′ ∈ o(∅).
Assume µr ∈ o′(∅) for o′ ∈ O, then µ(r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]]) = (µr)[∈ ∅] ∈ o′({∗}). We prove that
r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]] 2 r′[t′ 7→ t′[∈ ∅]]. Suppose for some o ∈ O and A ⊆ T1, it holds that r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]] ∈ o(A).
Let B := {t ∈ T1 | t[∈ ∅] ∈ A}, then r ∈ o(B). By (II) it holds that r′ ∈ o(4↑B).
For t′ ∈ (4↑B), there is a t ∈ B such that t 4 t′. Since t ∈ B, t[∈ ∅] ∈ A and hence t′[∈ ∅] ∈
(4↑A). So (4↑B) ⊆ {t′ ∈ T1 | t′[∈ ∅] ∈ (4↑A)}, and we can use upwards closure of o′ to derive
r′[t′ 7→ t′[∈ ∅]] ∈ o(4↑A). Hence by Lemma 4.14, r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]] 2 r′[t′ 7→ t′[∈ ∅]].
19
We can apply (I) to derive µ(r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]]) 4 µ(r′[t′ 7→ t′[∈ ∅]]). So since µ(r[t 7→ t[∈ ∅]]) =
(µr)[∈ ∅] ∈ o′({∗}), it holds that and µ(r′[t′ 7→ t′[∈ ∅]]) ∈ o′({∗}) and hence µr′ ∈ o′(∅). We conclude
that µr 4 µr′, so we are finished.
The second reformulation of decomposability shows that it is equivalent to being able to ‘decompose’
statements of the form µr ∈ o({∗}) into a collection of modal properties of r.
Lemma 4.17. A set of upwards-closed modalities O is decomposable if and only if for any r ∈ TT1
and o ∈ O such that µr ∈ o({∗}), there is a collection of pairs {(oi,Φi)}i∈I , with each oi ∈ O and
Φi ∈ CFV+ (1), satisfying the following two properties:
1. ∀i ∈ I, r ∈ oi(JΦiK).
2. ∀r′ ∈ TT1, (∀i ∈ I, r′ ∈ oi(JΦiK)) ⇒ µr′ ∈ o({∗}).
Proof. We use the equivalent statement for decomposability established in Lemma 4.16.
(⇒) Assume decomposability, and that for some r ∈ TT1 and o ∈ O, it holds that µr ∈ o({∗}).
For any A ⊆ TT1 such that r ∈ A, choose a pair (o′A,Φ
′
A) where o
′
A ∈ O and Φ
′
A ∈ CFV+ (1) such
that o′A(JΦ′AK) = A, if such a pair exists. All these chosen pairs together form our desired collection.
Since for any such A, r ∈ A = o′A(JΦ′AK), this collection satisfies condition (1). For any r′ ∈ TT1,
if r′ ∈ o′A(JΦ′AK) = A for any pair in the collection, then for any r ∈ A ⊆ TT1 for which there is
a pair o′′,Φ′′ such that o′′(JΦ′′K) = A, it holds that r′ ∈ A. So r 2 r′. Hence by decomposability,
∀o′′ ∈ O, µr ∈ o′′({∗})⇒ µr′ ∈ o′′({∗}), so in particular r′ ∈ o({∗}), and thus condition (2) holds.
(⇐) Assume the statement given in the lemma, we need to prove decomposability. For some
r, r′ ∈ TT1, suppose that r 2 r′. Now let o ∈ O such that µr ∈ o({∗}), then there is a collection of
pairs {(oi,Φi)}i∈I satisfying the properties given above. So by property (1), ∀i ∈ I, r ∈ oi(JΦiK), and
since r 2 r′ it holds that r′ ∈ oi(JΦiK). By property (2) we conclude that µr′ ∈ o({∗}) which is what
we needed to prove.
Below, we shall show that all our running examples satisfy the decomposability property. In all
cases we can do this by establishing a stronger property that is easier to verify. This strengthened
notion of decomposability is obtained by simplifying the property given in Lemma 4.17.
Definition 4.18 (Strong decomposability). We say that O is strongly decomposable if, for every
r ∈ TT1 and o ∈ O for which µr ∈ o({∗}), there exists a collection {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I of pairs of modalities
such that:
1. ∀i ∈ I, r ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})) ; and
2. for every r′ ∈ TT1, if for all i ∈ I, r′ ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})) then µr
′ ∈ o({∗}) .
Proposition 4.19. If O is strongly decomposable set of upwards closed modalities, then O is decom-
posable.
Proof. Using Lemma 4.17, this result is a simple consequence of the fact that for any oi ∈ O, oi(⊤) ∈
CFV+ (1) and Joi(⊤)K = oi({∗}).
Not all decomposable sets of Scott open modalities are strongly decomposable. Take for instance
O := {↓, ̂} for the signature Σ = {or : α2 → α}, where J↓K := { ∗ } and J̂K := (JK− {∗}).
We end this section by again looking at our running examples, and showing, in each case, that
the identified collection O only has Scott-open (hence upwards closed) modalities and is strongly
decomposable (hence decomposable). For any of the examples, upwards closure is easily established,
so we will not show it here.
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Example 0 (Pure functional computation). We have O = {↓} and J↓K = { ∗ }. Scott openness holds
since if ⊔iti = ∗ then for some i we must already have ti = ∗. It is strongly decomposable since:
µr ∈ J↓K ⇔ r ∈↓(↓({∗})), which means r returns a tree t which is a leaf ∗.
Example 1 (Error). We have O = {↓} ∪ {Ee | e ∈ E} and JEeK = { raisee }. Scott-openness holds
for both modalities for the same reason as in the previous example, and strong decomposability holds
since: µr ∈ J↓K ⇔ r ∈↓(↓({∗})) like in the previous example, and:
µr ∈ JEeK ⇔ r ∈ Ee(Ee({∗})) ∨ r ∈↓(Ee({∗})).
Which means r raises an error, or returns a tree that raises an error.
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). We have O = {♦} for angelic nondeterminism and O = {} for
demonic nondeterminism. The Scott-openness of J♦K = {t | t has some ∗ leaf} holds because if ⊔iti
has a ∗ leaf, then that leaf must already be contained in ti for some i. Similarly, if ⊔iti ∈ JK then,
because JK = {t | t has finite height and every leaf is a ∗}, the tree ⊔iti has finitely many leaves and
all must be contained in ti for some i. Hence ti ∈ JK for that i. Strong decomposability holds
because:
µr ∈ J♦K ⇔ r ∈ ♦(♦({∗})) and µr ∈ JK ⇔ r ∈ (({∗}) .
The former states that r has as a leaf a tree t, which itself has a leaf ∗. The latter states that r is
finite and all leaves are finite trees t that have only ∗ leaves. We can conclude that {♦} and {} are
both strongly decomposable sets of Scott open modalities. Moreover, it is obvious that their union
{♦,}, for neutral nondeterminism, is a strongly decomposable set of Scott open modalities too.
Example 3 (Probabilistic choice). O = {P>q | q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q < 1}. For the Scott-openness of JP>qK =
{t | P( t terminates with a ∗ leaf ) > q}, note that P(⊔iti terminates with a ∗ leaf ) is determined by
some countable sum over the leaves of ti. If this sum is greater than a rational q, then some finite
approximation of the sum must already be above q. The finite sum is over finitely many leaves from
⊔iti, all of which will be present in ti for some i. Hence ti ∈ JP>qK.
For strong decomposability, suppose µr ∈ P>q({∗}) . However, P(µr terminates with a ∗ leaf )
equals the integral of the (monotone decreasing) function fr(x) = sup{y ∈ [0, 1] | r ∈ P>y(P>x({∗}))}
from [0, 1] to [0, 1]. Informally, fr(x) is the probability that r returns a tree in the set JP>xK. Since∫ 1
0 fr(x) > q, we can find a monotone decreasing rational step function below fr whose integral is also
greater than q. This rational step function can be specified by rational numbers 0 < a0 < · · · < an < 1
and 1 > b0 > · · · > bn > 0 satisfying bi < fr(ai) and a0b0+
∑n
i=1(ai−ai−1)bi) > q . Then the collection
of pairs of modalities {(P>ai ,P>bi)}
n
i=1 satisfies the properties required by strong decomposability.
Example 4 (Global store). We have O = {(s ֌ s′) | s, s′ ∈ State}. For the Scott-openness ofJ(s֌ s′)K = {t | exec(t, s) = (∗, s′)}, note that if exec(⊔iti, s) = (∗, s′), there is a single finite branch
of t that follows the path the recursive function exec took. This branch must already be contained in
ti for some i. We also have strong decomposability since:
µr ∈ Js֌ s′K ⇔ ∃s′′ ∈ State, r ∈ (s֌ s′′)((s′′֌ s′)({∗})).
Which just means that for some s′′, it holds that exec(r, s) = (t, s′′) and exec(t, s′′) = (∗, s′).
Example 5 (Input/output). We have O = {〈w〉↓, 〈w〉... | w an i/o-trace}. For the Scott-openness ofJ〈w〉↓ K = {t | t |= 〈w〉↓ {∗} }, note that the i/o-trace 〈w〉↓ is given by some finite branch, which if
in ⊔iti must be in ti for some i. The Scott-openness of J〈w〉... K = {t | t |= 〈w〉... } holds for similar
reasons. We have strong decomposability because of the implications:
µr ∈ J〈w〉↓K ⇔ ∃v, u i/o-traces, vu = w ∧ r ∈ 〈v〉↓(〈u〉↓({∗})).
Which means r follows trace v returning t, and t follows trace u returning ∗.
µr ∈ J〈w〉...K ⇔ r ∈ 〈w〉...(〈〉...({∗})) ∨ (∃v, u, vu = w ∧ r ∈ 〈v〉↓ (〈u〉...({∗}))).
Which means either r follows trace w immediately, or it follows v returning a tree that follows u.
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In Example 2 above, we used the obvious fact that the property of being strongly decomposable
is preserved under union. Similarly, if all modalities are upwards-closed, then by Lemma 4.17, the
property of being decomposable is preserved under union.
Lemma 4.20. If O0 and O1 are decomposable sets of upwards closed modalities for the same signature
Σ, then O0 ∪ O1 is decomposable.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we need to relate the behavioural equivalence ≡V with a modality-
defined notion of applicative bisimilarity. As motivated in the introduction, the connection between
these two equivalences is interesting on its own. We will spend the next two sections defining this
notion of bisimilarity, establishing the connection with behavioural equivalence and proving that the
two relations are compatible. From Section 7 and onwards, we will return to only studying the
behavioural equivalence.
5 Applicative O-(bi)similarity
In this section, we define this notion of applicative bisimilarity based on a set of modalities O, and
establish that it is equal to the behavioural equivalence ≡V . Central to such a definition lies the concept
of a relator [49, 21], which we use to lift a relation on value terms to a relation on computation terms.
Later on in this section, we will prove that this relator, if based on a decomposable set of Scott
open modalities O, satisfies the right properties in order to prove the compatibility of bisimilarity in
Section 6.
Let O be some set of modalities for an effect signature Σ. We define a relator based on O.
Definition 5.1 (O-relator). The O-relator lifts for each two sets X and Y a relation R ⊆ X × Y to
a relation O(R) ⊆ TX × TY , such that
tO(R) t′ ⇐⇒ ∀A ⊆ X,∀o ∈ O, t ∈ o(A)⇒ t′ ∈ o(R↑A) .
Remember that R↑A := {y ∈ Y | ∃x ∈ A, xR y}, and t ∈ o(A) means t[∈ A] ∈ JoK. By Proposition
4.12 it holds that O(id1) = (4), and by Lemma 4.14 we know that O(4) =2.
We will use this relator to define an O-tailored variant of Abramsky’s applicative similarity [3].
First however, we describe the specific O-relators that arise for each of our running examples.
Example 0 (Pure functional computation). The statement t {↓}(R) r holds if and only if:
When t evaluates to x ∈ X then r evaluates to a y ∈ Y such that xR y.
Example 1 (Error). The statement t ({↓} ∪ {Ee | e ∈ E})(R) r holds precisely when the following
two statements hold:
- When t evaluates to x ∈ X then r evaluates to a y ∈ Y such that xR y.
- When t raises an error e ∈ E (meaning it is node raisee), then r raises the same error e.
Example 2 (Nondeterminism). t {♦, }(R) r holds precisely when the following statements hold:
- If x ∈ X is a leaf of t, then r has a leaf y ∈ Y such that xR y.
- If t is finite and has no ⊥ leaf, then r is finite and has no ⊥-leaf.
- If t is finite, has no ⊥ leaf, and y ∈ Y is a leaf of r, then t has a leaf x ∈ X such that xR y.
Example 3 (Probabilistic choice). It holds that t {P>q | q ∈ Q, 0 ≤ q < 1}(R) r if and only if:
For any A ⊆ X, the probability of t terminating with an element of A is at most the probability of r
terminating with a y related to some element of A (meaning there is an x ∈ A such that xR y).
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Example 4 (Global store). The statement t {(s֌ s′) | s, s′ ∈ State}(R) r holds if:
For any s ∈ State, if exec(t, s) = (x, s′) then there is a y ∈ Y such that exec(r, s) = (y, s′) and xR y.
Example 5 (Input/output). t {〈w〉↓, 〈w〉... | w an i/o-trace}(R) r holds precisely when the following
two statements hold:
- If t has w as initial execution trace, then r has w as an initial execution trace.
- If t has execution trace w terminating with x ∈ X, then r has trace w terminating with some
y ∈ Y such that xR y.
In each of the examples above, we obtain an O-relator that acts in line with expectations, based
on the explicit definitions of relators for different effects in the paper by Dal Lago et al. [17]. In our
case, these relators have been obtained in a uniform way from the corresponding sets of modalities O.
A direct comparison with definitions in the paper [17] is slightly involved, because our relators act
on the set of effect trees, given by applying the effect-tree monad T , whereas those in the paper [17]
are defined using effect-dependent monads M . For example, for probabilistic choice the distribution
monad is used. Despite this difference, there is still a tight relationship between the two approaches.
The tree monad T is the free-continuous-algebra monad over the effect signature Σ. There is thus an
induced ρX : TX →MX, mapping trees to elements of the effect-specific monad MX. It then holds,
for each effect example, that
tO(R) r ⇐⇒ ρ(t) Γ(R) ρ(r) ,
where Γ is the relevant relator from the paper [17] and O is the corresponding set of modalities from
this paper.
Following the paper [17], we use the relation-lifting operation of Definition 5.1 to define notions of
applicative similarity and bisimilarity. We assume that all modalities of O are upwards closed.
Definition 5.2 (Similarity). An applicative O-simulation is a pair of relations Rvτ and R
c
τ for each
type τ , where Rvτ ⊆ Val(τ)
2 and Rcτ ⊆ Com(τ)
2, such that:
1. V Rv
N
W =⇒ (V =W ) .
2. M Rcτ N =⇒ |M | O(R
v
τ ) |N | .
3. V Rvρ→τ W =⇒ ∀U ∈ Val(ρ), V U R
c
τ WU .
Applicative O-similarity is the largest applicative O-simulation, which is equal to the union of all
applicative O-simulations.
Definition 5.3 (Bisimilarity). An applicative O-bisimulation is a symmetric O-simulation. The
relation of O-bisimilarity is the largest applicative O-bisimulation.
Applicative O-similarity and O-bisimilarity may not exist for all sets of modalities O. But, if all
modalities of O are upwards closed (as asserted above), their existence is guaranteed. Though this
fact can be proven directly from relational properties established in Lemma 5.6, we can also see it as
a consequence of Theorem 2.
Lemma 5.4. Applicative O-bisimilarity is identical to the relation of applicative (O∩Oop)-similarity,
where Oop(R) := (O(Rop))op, so t (O ∩Oop)(R) r ⇔ tO(R) r ∧ rO(Rop) t.
Proof. LetR be theO-bisimilarity, then by symmetry we haveRop = R. So ifM RN we haveN RM ,
and by the simulation rules we derive |M | O(R) |N | and |N | O(R) |M |, so R is an O∩Oop-simulation.
Let R be the O ∩ Oop-similarity. If M RopN then |N | (O ∩ Oop)(R) |M | so |N | O(R) |M | ∧
|M | O(Rop) |N | which results in |M | (O∩Oop)(Rop) |N |. Verifying the other simulation conditions as
well, we can conclude that the symmetric closure R∪Rop is an O∩Oop-simulation. So R = R∪Rop
and hence R is a symmetric O-simulation.
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For brevity, we will leave out the word “applicative” from here on out. The key result now is that
the maximal relation, the O-similarity is, given our assertion that all modalities are upwards closed,
the same object as our logical preorder. We first give a short Lemma.
Lemma 5.5 (Characteristic formulas). For any fragment L of V closed under countable conjunction,
it holds that for each value V there is a formula χLV ∈ L such that W |=L χ
L
V ⇔ V ⊑L W . Similarly,
for every computation M , there is a computation formula χLM ∈ L such that N |=L χ
L
M ⇔M ⊑L N .
Proof. We prove the statement for values V . For each U such that (V 6⊑L U), choose a formula
φU ∈ L such that V |=L φ
U and (U 6|= φU ). Then if we define χV :=
∧
{U |V 6⊑LU}
(U 7→ φU ) it holds
that V 6⊑L U ⇔ U 6|= χV , which is what we want.
As in the proof above, we usually omit the superscript L when clear from the context. Note that when
L is the full logic V, it holds that
N |=V χ
L
M ⇔ M ≡V N , (4)
and similarly for value formulas.
Theorem 2 (A). For any family of upwards closed modalities O, we have that the logical preorder
⊑V+ is identical to O-similarity.
Proof. We write ⊑ instead of ⊑V+ to make room for other annotations. We first prove that our logical
preorder ⊑ is an O-simulation by induction on types.
1. Values of N. If n ⊑v
N
m, then since n |= {n} we have that m |= {n}, hence m = n.
2. Computations of τ . AssumeM ⊑cτ N , we prove that |M | O(⊑
v
τ ) |N |. Take A ⊆ Val(τ) and o ∈ O
such that |M | ∈ o(A). Taking the following formula φA :=
∨
a∈A χa (where χa as in Lemma 5.5),
then b |= φA ⇔ ∃a ∈ A, a ⊑
v
τ b ⇔ b ∈ (⊑
v
τ )
↑A and ∀a ∈ A, a |= φA. So |M |[|= φA] ≥ |M |[∈ A],
hence since o is upwards closed, |M |[|= φA] ∈ JoK. By M ⊑cτ N we have |N |[|= φA] ∈ JoK and
hence |N | ∈ o((⊑vτ )
↑A). We conclude that |M | O(⊑vτ ) |N |.
3. Function values of ρ→ τ . This step follows from Lemma 4.3 and the induction hypothesis.
We can conclude that ⊑ is an O-simulation. Now take an arbitrary O-simulation R. We prove by
induction on types that R ⊆ (⊑).
1. Values of N. If V Rv
N
W then V =W , hence by reflexivity we get V ⊑v
N
W .
2. Computations of τ . Assume M Rcτ N , we prove that M ⊑
c
τ N using the characterisation from
Lemma 4.4. Say for o ∈ O and φ ∈ VF (τ) we have M |= o φ. Let Aφ := {a ∈ Val(τ) | a |= φ} ⊆
Val(τ), then |M | ∈ o(Aφ) hence by M R
c
τ N and the simulation property, we derive |N | ∈
o((Rvτ )
↑Aφ). By the induction hypothesis on values of τ , we know that R
v
τ ⊆ (⊑
v
τ ), hence
‘∃a ∈ Aφ, aR
v
τ b’ implies b |= φ. We get that |N |[|= φ] ≥ |N |[∈ (R
v
τ )
↑Aφ], so by upwards closure
of o we have |N |[|= φ] ∈ JoK meaning N |= o φ. We conclude that M ⊑cτ N .
3. Function values of ρ→ τ . Assume V Rvρ→τ W . We prove V ⊑
v
ρ→τ W using the characterisation
from Lemma 4.3. Assume V |= (U 7→ Φ) where U ∈ Val(ρ) and Φ ∈ CF (τ), so V U |= Φ.
By V Rvρ→τ W we have V U R
c
τ WU and by the induction hypothesis we have R
c
τ ⊆ (⊑
c
τ ), so
V U ⊑cτ WU . Hence WU |= Φ meaning W |= (U 7→ Φ). We can conclude that V ⊑
v
ρ→τ W .
4. Values of 1. If V Rv
1
W then V = ∗ =W hence V ⊑v
1
W .
In conclusion: any O-simulation R is a subset of the O-simulation ⊑V+. So ⊑V+ is O-similarity.
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Adapting the proof slightly, we can find the connection between full behavioural equivalence and
O-bisimilarity.
Theorem 2 (B). For any family of upwards closed modalities O, we have that the logical equivalence
≡V is identical to O-bisimilarity.
Proof. Note first that ≡V is symmetric. Secondly, note that since ≡V =⊑V we know by Lemma 5.5,
that for any V , there is a formula χV such that W |= χV ⇔ V ≡V W . Using these observations and
the appropriate adjustments to Lemma 4.3 and 4.4, the proof of this result is as in Theorem 2(A),
proving ≡V is a symmetric O-simulation and contains any other symmetric O-simulation.
Given Theorem 2(b), it is straightforward to observe an expressive completeness result with respect
to the notion of behavioural property induced by O-bisimilarity (as adumbrated in Section 1). A subset
S ⊆ Com(τ) (respectively S ⊆ Val(τ)) may be called behavioural if it respects bisimilarity; that is,
in the case of computations, if M ∈ S and M is bisimilar to M ′ then M ′ ∈ S. It follows from
Theorem 2(b) that the behavioural subsets coincide with the logically definable subsets. Namely, S ⊆
Com(τ) is behavioural if and only if there exists a formula Φ ∈ CF (τ) such that S = {M | M |= Φ};
and similarly, any S ⊆ Val(τ) is behavioural if and only if there exists a formula φ ∈ VF (τ) such that
S = {V | V |= φ} . The proof is straightforward, given the observation that every behavioural S is a
union of equivalence classes under bisimilarity. Hence, for example, Φ may be defined as an infinite
disjunction
Φ :=
∨
M∈S
χM ,
using the characteristic formulas obtained in (4) above.
5.1 Relator properties
In this subsection, we identify abstract properties of our relation lifting O(R), which will be used in our
application of Howe’s method, in Section 6. The necessary properties were identified in the paper [17].
The contribution of this paper is that all the required properties follow from our modality-based
definition of O(R).
The first set of properties tell us that O(−) is indeed a relator in the sense of Levy [21].
Lemma 5.6. If the modalities from O are upwards closed, then O(−) is a relator, meaning that:
1. If R ⊆ X ×X is reflexive, then so is O(R).
2. ∀R ⊆ X × Y,∀S ⊆ Y × Z, O(R)O(S) ⊆ O(RS), where RS ⊆ X × Z is relation composition.
3. ∀R ⊆ X × Y,∀S ⊆ X × Y, R ⊆ S ⇒ O(R) ⊆ O(S).
4. ∀f : X → Z, g : Y →W,R ⊆ Z ×W,O((f × g)−1R) = (Tf × Tg)−1O(R)
where (f × g)−1(R) = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | f(x)R g(y)} 7.
Proof. We prove each property separately.
1. For any set A ⊆ X we have A ⊆ (R↑A) by reflexivity of R. So for any t ∈ TX, if t ∈ o(A) then
by upwards closure of o we have t ∈ o(R↑A). We conclude that tO(R) t.
2. We can see this by observing that (RS)↑A = {z ∈ Z | ∃x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, xR y S z} = S↑(R↑A),
and with tO(R) rO(S) l it holds that t ∈ o(A)⇒ r ∈ o(R↑A)⇒ l ∈ o(S↑(R↑A)).
7In general, given h : X → Y , A ⊆ X, and B ⊆ Y , we write h(A) := {h(x) | x ∈ X} and h−1(B) := {x ∈ X |
h(x) ∈ B}.
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3. With R ⊆ S it holds that R↑A ⊆ S↑A for any set A ⊆ X. Assume tO(R) r and t ∈ o(A), then
r ∈ o(R↑A). Hence with r[∈ S↑A] ≥ r[∈ R↑A] and by upwards closure of o, r ∈ o(S↑A).
4. If tO((f × g)−1R) r then for all A ⊆ X and o ∈ O, t ∈ o(A) ⇒ r ∈ o(((f × g)−1R)
↑
A) ⇒
r ∈ o(g−1(R↑f(A)). Assume that for some B we have Tf(t) ∈ o(B), then t ∈ o(f−1(B)) so
r ∈ o(g−1(R↑f(f−1(B)))). Considering that f(f−1(B)) ⊆ B and o is upwards closed, we derive
that r ∈ o(g−1(R↑B)) and hence Tg(r) ∈ o(R↑B). This is for all such B and o, so we can
conclude that Tf(t)O(R)Tg(r).
Now assume Tf(t)O(R)Tg(r) and t ∈ o(A), then since Tf(t) ∈ o(f(A)) we have Tg(r) ∈
o(R↑f(A)) so r ∈ o(g−1(R↑f(A))). This is for all such A and o, hence tO((f × g)−1R) r.
The next property together with the previous lemma establishes that O(−) is a monotone relator in
the sense of Thijs [49].
Lemma 5.7. If the modalities from O are upwards closed, then O(−) is monotone, meaning for any
f : X → Z, g : Y →W , R ⊆ X × Y and S ⊆ Z ×W :
tO(R) r ∧ (∀x, y, xR y ⇒ f(x)S g(y)) =⇒ t[x 7→ f(x)]O(S) r[y 7→ g(y)]
Proof. Let R ⊆ X × Y and S ⊆ A×B. Assume: (i) ∀x, y, xR y ⇒ f(x)S g(y) and (ii) tO(R) r.
Take o ∈ O and K ⊆ TA such that t[x 7→ f(x)] ∈ o(K). Take L = f−1(K), then t ∈ o(L). So by
(ii), r ∈ o(R↑L). For y ∈ (R↑L), there is an x ∈ L such that xR y, hence by (i) we have f(x)S g(y).
Since x ∈ L means f(x) ∈ K, it holds that g(y) ∈ (S↑K), hence (R↑L) ⊆ g−1(S↑K). Using upwards
closure of o, r ∈ o(g−1(S↑K)), and hence r[y 7→ g(y)] ∈ o(S↑K). Since this is for all o ∈ O and
K ⊆ TA with t[x 7→ f(x)] ∈ o(K), we can conclude that t[x 7→ f(x)]O(S) r[y 7→ g(y)].
The relator also interacts well with the monad structure on T .
Lemma 5.8. If O is a decomposable set of upwards closed modalities, then:
1. xR y ⇒ η(x)O(R) η(y).
2. tO(O(R)) r ⇒ µtO(R)µr.
Proof. We prove the properties separately.
1. Note that η(x) ∈ o(A) either means x ∈ A and ∗ ∈ JoK, or ⊥ ∈ JoK. By upwards closure, if
⊥ ∈ JoK then JoK = T1. If x ∈ A then y ∈ R↑A. Either way, η(y) ∈ o(R↑A).
2. Take tO(O(R)) r and (µt) ∈ o(K) where o ∈ O. Take A ⊆ T1 and γ ∈ O such that
t[a 7→ a[∈ K]] ∈ γ(A). Let S := {a | a[∈ K] ∈ A}, then t ∈ γ(S). By tO(O(R)) r we get
r ∈ γ(O(R)↑S).
In the following paragraph we prove that for b ∈ (O(R)↑S), b[∈ R↑K] ∈ (4↑A), using charac-
terisation 3 of 4 from Proposition 4.12.
For b ∈ (O(R)↑S), there is an a ∈ S such that a[∈ K] ∈ A and aO(R) b. If a[∈ K] ∈ δ({∗})
for some δ ∈ O, then a ∈ δ(K), so b ∈ δ(R↑K) and hence b[∈ R↑K] ∈ δ({∗}). If a[∈ K] ∈ δ(∅)
for some δ ∈ O, then a ∈ δ(∅), so we have b ∈ δ(R↑∅). Since R↑∅ = ∅, b ∈ δ(∅) and hence
b[∈ R↑K] ∈ δ(∅). With the previous two derivations, we see that a[∈ K] 4 b[∈ R↑K], hence
b[∈ R↑K] ∈ (4↑A) since a[∈ K] ∈ A. So the following inclusion holds:
(O(R)↑S) ⊆ {b | b[∈ R↑K] ∈ (4↑A)} .
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By upwards closure of γ and r ∈ γ(O(R)↑S) we get r ∈ γ({b | b[∈ R↑K] ∈ (4↑A)}). So
we have derived that (t[a 7→ a[∈ K]] ∈ γ(A)) ⇒ (r[b 7→ b[∈ R↑K]] ∈ γ(4↑A)) for all γ and
A. By Lemma 4.14, t[a 7→ a[∈ K]] 2 r[b 7→ b[∈ R↑K]], hence by decomposability we get
(µt)[∈ K] = µ(t[a 7→ a[∈ K]]) 4 µ(r[b 7→ b[∈ R↑K]]) = (µr)[∈ R↑K]. Hence with µt ∈ o(K)
assumed at the beginning, we get µt ∈ o(R↑K), and we conclude µtO(R)µr.
Finally, the following properties show that relators behave well with respect to the order on trees.
Lemma 5.9. If O only contains Scott open modalities, then for R ⊆ X × Y :
1. If R is reflexive, then for any t ∈ TX, r ∈ TY it holds that t ≤ r ⇒ tO(R) r.
2. For any two sequences u0 ≤ u1 ≤ u2 ≤ . . . from TX and v0 ≤ v1 ≤ v2 ≤ . . . from TY :
∀n, (unO(R) vn) ⇒ (⊔nun)O(R) (⊔nvn)
Proof. We separate the proofs by property.
1. If R is reflexive then O(R) is reflexive by Lemma 5.6. Now for t ≤ r, if t ∈ o(A) then since
t[∈ A] ≤ r[∈ A] we have r ∈ o(A). By reflexivity rO(R) r, so r ∈ o(R↑A).
2. Take A ⊆ X and o ∈ O such that (⊔nun) ∈ o(A). Now (⊔nun)[∈ A] = ⊔n(un[∈ A]) so by Scott
openness, there is an m such that um ∈ o(A). Using the assumption we derive vm ∈ o(R
↑A).
Note that vm ≤ ⊔nvn, hence vm[∈ R
↑A] ≤ ⊔nvn[∈ R
↑A], so since o is Scott open we conclude
that (⊔nvn) ∈ o(R
↑A).
The lemmas above list the core properties of the relator, which are satisfied when our set O is
decomposable and contains only Scott open modalities. The results below follow from those above,
specifically the next result combines Lemma 5.8 with the fact that O(id1) =4 and O(4) =2.
Corollary 5.10. If O contains only upwards closed modalities, then:
O is decomposable ⇐⇒ ∀R ⊆ X × Y,∀t ∈ TTX, r ∈ TTY, (tO(O(R)) r ⇒ µtO(R)µr) .
Lastly, we verify that sequencing and the algebraic effect operations interact in the appropriate
way with the relator action.
Corollary 5.11. If O is a decomposable set of upwards closed modalities, then lifted relations are
preserved by Kleisli lifting and effect operations:
1. Given f : X → TZ, g : Y → TW , R ⊆ X × Y and S ⊆ Z ×W , if for all x ∈ X and y ∈ Y we
have xR y ⇒ f(x)O(S) g(y) and if tO(R) r then µ(t[x 7→ f(x)])O(S)µ(r[y 7→ g(y)]).
2. (∀k, ukO(S) vk) ⇒ σ(u0, u1, . . . )O(S)σ(v0, v1, . . . )
Proof. We prove the properties separately.
1. Using Lemma 5.7 on the assumptions we get t[x 7→ f(x)]O(O(S)) r[y 7→ g(y)]. We can then
apply property 2 of Lemma 5.8 to get the correct result.
2. We apply the previous property to the following data; t = r = σ(0, 1, 2, . . . ) ∈ TN, f(n) = un,
g(n) = vn for all n ∈ N, and R = idN. The conclusion follows directly.
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Γ, x : τ ⊢ x R̂v x
(C1)
Γ ⊢ Z R̂v Z
(C2)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′
Γ ⊢ S(V ) R̂v S(V ′)
(C3)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′
Γ ⊢ return(V ) R̂c return(V ′)
(C4)
Γ, x : τ ⊢M RcM
′
Γ ⊢ (λx : τ.M) R̂v (λx : τ.M ′)
(C5)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′ Γ ⊢W RvW
′
Γ ⊢ (V W ) R̂c (V ′W ′)
(C6)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′
Γ ⊢ fix(V ) R̂v fix(V ′)
(C7)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′ Γ ⊢M RcM
′ Γ, x : N ⊢ N RcN
′
Γ ⊢ ( case V of {Z ⇒M ;S(x)⇒ N}) R̂c (case V ′ of {Z ⇒M ′;S(x)⇒ N ′})
(C8)
Γ ⊢M RcM
′ Γ, x : τ ⊢ N RcN
′
Γ ⊢ (let M ⇒ x in N) R̂c (let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′)
(C9)
Γ ⊢MiRcM
′
i
Γ ⊢ σ(M0,M1, . . . ) R̂c σ(M ′0,M
′
1, . . . )
(CA)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′
Γ ⊢ σ(V ) R̂c σ(V ′)
(CB)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′ Γ ⊢MiRcM
′
i
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;M0,M1, . . . ) R̂c σ(V ′;M ′0,M
′
1, . . . )
(CC)
Γ ⊢ V Rv V
′ Γ ⊢W Rv W
′
Γ ⊢ σ(V ;W ) R̂c σ(V ′;W ′)
(CD)
Figure 4: Compatible refinement rules
Point 2 of Corollary 5.11 has been stated in such a way that it contains both the infinite arity case
αN → α and the finite arity case αn → α of effect operations σ. So it states that any lifted relation
is preserved under any of the predefined algebraic effects (assuming equality between any possible
natural numbers arguments given by the arity). The next section focusses on proving Theorem 1
using a generalisation of Howe’s method.
6 Howe’s method
In this section, we apply Howe’s method [11, 12] to establish the compatibility of applicative O-
similarity and O-bisimilarity, and hence compatibility of the positive behavioural preorder and full
behavioural equivalence. Given a relation R on terms, one defines its Howe closure R•, which is
compatible and contains the open extension R◦. Our proof makes use of the relator properties from
Section 5, closely following the approach of Dal Lago et al. [17]. We will only give an outline of the
proof, focussing on the main steps. Detailed proofs can be found in Appendix A.
Recall from Section 4 that, for any closed relation R, we can define the open extension R◦ as
Γ ⊢M R◦N : τ ⇔ ∀
−→
V : Γ,M [
−→
V ]RN [
−→
V ]. We define two more closure operations.
Definition 6.1. Taking an open relationR, we define the compatible refinement R̂ using the derivation
rules in Fig. 4. For a closed relation R we define the Howe closure R• as the smallest open relation
S closed under the rules:
Γ ⊢ V ŜvW Γ ⊢W R
◦
v L
Γ ⊢ V Sv L
(HV)
Γ ⊢M ŜcN Γ ⊢ N R
◦
c K
Γ ⊢MScK
(HC)
Note that R is compatible if and only if R̂ ⊆ R. The Howe closure can also be expressed as the
least solution for S of the equation S = ŜR◦, or of the inclusion ŜR◦ ⊆ S.
The following result contains the main properties of the Howe closure we are interested in, e.g.
from Lassen [19].
Lemma 6.2. If R is reflexive, then:
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1. R• is compatible, hence reflexive.
2. R◦ ⊆ R•.
3. If x : ρ ⊢ AR•B and V,W : ρ such that V R•W , then A[V ]R•B[W ]
The main step of the Howe’s method proof is establishing the following result.
Proposition 6.3. If O is a decomposable set of Scott open modalities, then for any preorder applicative
O-simulation ⊑, the Howe closure ⊑• limited to closed terms is an applicative O-simulation.
This is proven by checking the simulation properties of Definition 5.2 one by one. The most
difficulty arises when trying to prove property 2, which is done inductively using the following lemma,
and uses most of the relator properties from Subsection 5.1.
Lemma 6.4 (Key Lemma). For any n ∈ N, given two closed computation terms A and B, if A ⊑• B
then |A|nO(⊑
•) |B|.
Having established the Key Lemma, we can use Lemma 5.9, implying (∀n ∈ N, |A|nO(⊑
•) |B|)⇒
|A| O(⊑•) |B|, to derive property 2 of O-simulations and finalise the proof of Proposition 6.3. The
complete proofs of the previous lemmas and Proposition 6.3 can be found in Appendix A.
Using Proposition 6.3, we can derive the compatibility of applicativeO-similarity andO-bisimilarity.
Theorem 3 (A). If O is a decomposable set of Scott open modalities, then the open extension of the
relation of applicative O-similarity is compatible.
Proof. Before we start the proof, we observe the following general result. If a compatible relation R
is contained in a closed relation S when limited to closed terms, then R ⊆ S◦ since:
Γ ⊢M RN ⇒ ∀
−→
V : Γ,M [
−→
V /−→x ]RN [
−→
V /−→x ]⇒ ∀
−→
V : Γ,M [
−→
V /−→x ]S N [
−→
V /−→x ]⇒ Γ ⊢M S◦N .
We write ⊑s for the relation of O-similarity. Since ⊑s is an O-simulation, we know by Proposition
6.3 that ⊑•s limited to closed terms is one as well, and hence is contained in the largest O-simulation
⊑s. By Lemma 6.2 it holds that ⊑
•
s is compatible, and by the observation before we know it is
contained in the open extension ⊑◦s. Again by Lemma 6.2, we also know that ⊑
◦
s is contained in ⊑
•
s.
We can conclude that ⊑◦s is equal to the Howe closure ⊑
•
s, which is compatible.
To prove that O-bisimilarity is compatible, we need another result from Lassen [19] (a proof is also
given in Appendix A).
Lemma 6.5. If R◦ is symmetric and reflexive, then R•∗ (the transitive closure of R•) is symmetric.
Given these facts, we can derive the following.
Theorem 3 (B). If O is a decomposable set of Scott open modalities, then the open extension of the
relation of applicative O-bisimilarity is compatible.
Proof. We write O-bisimilarity as ⊑b. From Proposition 6.3 we know that ⊑
•
b on closed terms is an
O-simulation. Using property 2 of Lemma 5.6, we can verify that the transitive closure ⊑•∗b is an
O-simulation as well. Since ⊑b is reflexive and symmetric, we know by the previous lemma that ⊑
•∗
b
is symmetric. Hence ⊑•∗b is an O-bisimulation, implying (⊑
•∗
b ) ⊆ (⊑
◦
b) by compatibility of ⊑
•∗
b (due
to Lemma 6.2 and the same reasoning from the previous proof). Again by Lemma 6.2, it holds that
(⊑◦b) ⊆ (⊑
•
b) ⊆ (⊑
•∗
b ), hence (⊑
•∗
b ) = (⊑
◦
b). We can conclude that ⊑
◦
b is compatible.
Note that Theorem 1 is an immediate consequence of Theorems 2 and 3. As such, we have finished
the proof of compatibility of the full behavioural equivalence and positive behavioural preorder.
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7 Comparing equivalences
Our development thus far has focused on two main relations for comparing programs. The first
is the behavioural equivalence ≡V defined via the full logic with negation and characterised as O-
bisimilarity. The second is the positive behavioural preorder ⊑V+, defined via the negation-free logic
and characterised as O-similarity. The latter preorder induces the equivalence relation ≡V+ of mutual
O-similarity.
As discussed after Definition 4.2, there is an inclusion ≡V ⊆ ≡V+. That is, O-bisimilarity implies
mutual O-similarity. It is a standard fact in concurrency theory that ordinary mutual similarity is in
general a strictly coarser relation than bisimilarity. A similar fact holds in the context of the present
paper: it is possible that the inclusion ≡V ⊆ ≡V+ is strict. We illustrate this with an example,
adapted from Lassen’s PhD thesis [19, page 92], for which the two relations do not coincide. (Ong
gives another example of a similar phenomenon [30].)
Example 7.1 (Separating the full and positive behavioural equivalence, cf. [19]). We take Σ := {or :
α2 → α} and O := {♦,} from Example 2. Let Ω : 1 be some always diverging computation term.
We consider the following two computation terms of type (1→ 1):
M := or ( return(λx : 1. (return ∗)), return(λx : 1.Ω))
N := or (M, return(λx : 1. (or ( return ∗, Ω)))
We make use of our logics V and V+ to give simple proofs that M ≡V+ N but M 6≡V N .
By definition, M ≡V+ N if the two terms satisfy the same positive computation formulas of
type (1 → 1). Note that ♦(⊥) and (⊥) are not satisfied by any terms, ♦(φ) ∨ (φ) is satisfied
precisely if ♦(φ) is, and ♦(φ) ∧ (φ) is satisfied precisely if (φ) is. Moreover, (V 7→ Φ) ∧ (V 7→ Ψ)
and (V 7→ Φ) ∨ (V 7→ Ψ) are equivalent to (V 7→ (Φ ∧ Ψ)) and (V 7→ (Φ ∨ Ψ)) respectively. By
these observations and Lemma 4.4, we can reduce the set of formulas we need to check to establish
equivalence between two computation terms of type (1→ 1) to:
{♦(⊤), (⊤), ♦(∗ 7→ ♦(⊤)), ♦(∗ 7→ (⊤)), (∗ 7→ ♦(⊤)), (∗ 7→ (⊤))}
The terms M and N both satisfy the same formulas from this set, namely ♦(⊤),(⊤),♦(∗ 7→ ♦(⊤)),
and ♦(∗ 7→ (⊤)). We conclude that M ≡V+ N .
The terms M and N are not however equivalent under full behavioural equivalence, since N
satisfies the formula ♦(∗ 7→ (♦(⊤) ∧ ¬(⊤))), but M does not. (This formula says of a computation
of type (1 → 1) that it may return a lambda term which, when applied to argument ∗, results in a
nondeterministic computation that may diverge and may also terminate.) Thus M 6≡V N .
It is also instructive to compare ≡V and ≡V+ to contextual equivalence, which is often taken to be
the default equivalence for applicative programming languages. For the language of this paper, the
collection O of modalities used to define our logics serves a further purpose: via the preorder 4 on
unit-type computation trees from Section 4, it gives rise to a natural definition of contextual preorder
between terms of the same type and aspect (value or computation). The idea is that two terms M,N
of the same type τ and aspect are related by the contextual preorder ⊑ctxt if for any context C(−)
of unit type, accepting terms of type τ of the relevant aspect, we have |C(M)| 4 |C(N)|.8 The same
definition can be given more elegantly using compatibility.
Definition 7.2 (Contextual preorder/equivalence). The contextual preorder relation ⊑ctxt is the
largest compatible preorder satisfying:
for all M,N ∈ Com(1), it holds that M ⊑ctxt N implies |M | 4 |N |. (5)
8If one expands the use of 4 in this definition as in statement 3 of Proposition 4.12, one obtains a definition of
contextual preorder in terms of basic unit-type ‘observations’ of the form o({∗}) and o(∅).
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The relation ≡ctxt of contextual equivalence is the equivalence relation determined by ⊑ctxt (i.e., the
intersection of ⊑ctxt and its converse).
If O is a decomposable set of Scott-open modalities then, by Theorem 1 and Proposition 4.11,
⊑V+ is a compatible preorder satisfying condition (5) above. Hence, there is an inclusion of relations
⊑V+ ⊆ ⊑ctxt. We thus have a chain of inclusions between equivalence relations.
≡V ⊆ ≡V+ ⊆ ≡ctxt .
Having already shown the left-hand inclusion to be strict in general, we now show that the right-hand
inclusion can also be strict. This is again based on an example from Lassen [19].
Example 7.3 (Separating contextual equivalence and positive behavioural equivalence, c.f. [19]). We
take Σ := {or : α2 → α} and O := {♦} from Example 2, that is we consider angelic nondeterminism.
The example we give differs marginally from Lassen [19, page 90], in that one of the terms involved
does not exhibit any effectful behaviour. Let id : N → N be the value term given by the identity
function λx : N.(return x). We can define approximations of this identity function, using a term
apid : N→ (N→ N) such that for any two natural numbers n,m ∈ N:
|let (apid n)⇒ y in (y m)| =
{
m if m < n
⊥ otherwise.
So for any natural number n ∈ N, ‘apid n’ returns the n-th approximation of the identity function.
Given the computation term ?N of type N from Example 2 at the end of Section 2, which non-
deterministically returns any natural number, we define the nondeterministic approximation of the
identity function:
M := let ?N ⇒ x in (return λy.(let (apid x)⇒ z in (z y)))
This term nondeterministically returns any approximation of the identity function. It holds that M is
contextually equivalent to return(id) under the angelic interpretation of nondeterminism, since if a
context holding the function terminates, it will have in the process of computation only fed the function
a finite number of arguments. As such, in any context, there is always a large enough approximation
of the identity which cannot be distinguished from the identity function. This outline argument that
M ≡ctxt return(id) can be made precise along the lines of Lassen [19, Example 6.4.4].
However, M and return(id) are distinguished by the positive logic, since M cannot return the
identity function itself. Specifically, the formula ♦(
∧
n∈N n 7→ ♦({n})) is satisfied by return(id) but
not by M . Thus M 6≡V+ return(id).
It is an interesting question whether our modal behavioural logic can be used to better understand
the relationship between applicative (bi)similarity and contextual equivalence/preorder. For example,
in the case of effects for which the relations differ (such as nondeterminism), can the logic be restricted
to characterise contextual equivalence/preorder?
8 Pure behavioural logic
In this section, we explore an alternative formulation of our logic. This has both conceptual and
practical motivations. Our very approach to behavioural logic, fits into the category of endogenous
logics in the sense of Pnueli [42]. Formulas (φ and Φ) express properties of individual programs,
through satisfaction relations (V |= φ and M |= Φ). Programs are thus considered as ‘models’ of the
logic, with the satisfaction relation being defined via program behaviour.
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It is conceptually appealing to push the separation between program and logic to its natural con-
clusion, and ask for the syntax of the logic to be independent of the syntax of the programming
language. Indeed, it seems natural that it should be possible to express properties of program be-
haviour without knowledge of the syntax of the programming language. Under our formulation of the
logic V, this desideratum is violated by the value formula (V 7→ Ψ) at function type, which mentions
the programming language value V .
This issue can be addressed, by replacing the basic value formula (V 7→ Ψ) with the alternative
(φ 7→ Ψ), already mentioned in Section 3. Such a change also has a practical motivation. The
formula (φ 7→ Ψ) declares a precondition and postcondition for function application, supporting a
useful specification style. It also supports the expression of various other properties that are natural
from the point of view of program specification. For example, using negation, we can define the dual
formula ¬(φ 7→ ¬Φ), with the resulting semantics9:
W |= ¬(φ 7→ ¬Ψ) ⇔ ∃V ∈Val(τ). V |= φ andWV |= Ψ .
Further examples of the usefulness of the pure behavioural logic will be given in Section 9.
Definition 8.1. The pure behavioural logic F is defined by replacing rule (2) in Fig. 2 with the
alternative:
φ ∈ VF (ρ) Ψ ∈ CF (τ)
(φ 7→ Ψ) ∈ VF (ρ→ τ)
(2∗)
The semantics is modified by defining W |= (φ 7→ Ψ) using formula (2) of Section 3.
W |= (φ 7→ Ψ) ⇔ ∀V ∈Val(τ). V |= φ impliesWV |= Ψ .
With the definition of (φ 7→ Ψ) within V, given in (1) of Section 3, we can see F as a fragment of
V (and F+ a fragment of V+), resulting in the following fact.
Lemma 8.2. Any formula of F and F+ is equivalent to some formula of V and V+ respectively.
Moreover, once we have established compatibility, we have the following result.
Proposition 8.3. If the open extension of ≡V is compatible then the logics V and F are equi-
expressive. Similarly, if the open extension of ⊑V+ is compatible then the logics V
+ and F+ are
equi-expressive.
Proof. Lemma 8.2 tells us we can translate any formula from F into an equivalent formula from
V. For the reverse translation, whose correctness proof is more interesting, we give more detail.
Every value (respectively computation) formula, φ (respectively Φ), of V is inductively translated to
a corresponding formula φ̂ (respectively Φ̂) of F . We do this by induction on the structure of the
formula, where we define the following translation:
{̂n} := {n}, ô φ := o φ̂,
∨̂
I
φ :=
∨
I
φ̂,
∧̂
I
φ :=
∧
I
φ̂, ¬̂φ := ¬φ̂
̂(V 7→ Φ) := (ψV 7→ Φ̂ ) ,
where, in the last case, ψV is the formula χ
F
V from Lemma 5.5. Hence: V |=F ψV ; and, for any ψ, if
V |=F ψ then ψV → ψ (meaning that V
′ |=F ψV implies V
′ |=F ψ, for all V
′).
9Given compatibility of ⊑V+ , this formula is equivalent to
∨
{V |V |=φ} χV 7→ Ψ, where χV is from Lemma 5.5. As
such, it may also be formulated without the use of negation in the positive behavioural logic V+.
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One now proves, by induction on types, followed by an induction on formulas φ (or Φ) of this type,
that the F-semantics of φ̂ (resp. Φ̂) coincides with the V-semantics of φ (resp. Φ). This induction is
obvious in all cases except for formula ̂(V 7→ Φ) of a function type, for which we need to show that:
W |=F ψV 7→ Φ̂ if and only if WV |=F Φ̂.
For the interesting right-to-left implication, suppose thatWV |=F Φ̂, and consider any V
′ satisfying
V ′ |=F ψV . By the induction hypothesis, using the defining property of ψV , we have that V
′ ≡V V .
It then follows from the compatibility of ≡V that WV
′ ≡V WV , whence WV
′ ≡F WV , again by the
induction hypothesis. Thus it follows from WV |=F Φ̂ that WV
′ |=F Φ̂, as required.
The proof in the case of the positive logics is similar.
Combining the above proposition with Theorem 1 we obtain the following.
Corollary 8.4. Suppose O is a decomposable family of Scott-open modalities. Then ≡F coincides with
≡V , and ⊑F+ coincides with ⊑V+. Hence the open extensions of ≡F , ⊑F+ , and ≡F+ are compatible.
We do not know any proof of the compatibility of the ≡F and ⊑F+ relations that does not go via the
logic V. In particular, it is the presence of general recursion in the programming language (via the fix
operator) that has thwarted attempts to give direct proofs of compatibility for the pure-logic-induced
preorder and equivalence.
9 Reasoning with the logic
The behavioural logics considered in this paper are designed for the purpose of formalising the notion
of ‘behavioural property’, and for defining behavioural equivalence. As infinitary propositional logics,
they are not directly suited to practical applications such as specification and verification. Never-
theless, they serve as low-level logics into which more practical finitary logics can be translated. For
this, the closure of the logics under infinitary propositional logic is important. For example, there are
standard translations of quantifiers and least and greatest fixed points into infinitary propositional
logic. Furthermore, practical idioms for expressing effect-related properties can also be translated into
logical combinations of modal formulas.
We illustrate this last point, by showing how Hoare triples, the standard formalism for specifying
programs with global store, compile into our propositional logic with (s ֌ s′) modalities, for the
language with lookup and update operations (Example 4). Take for example the statement {l =
z}M{l′ = z!}, where l, l′ ∈ L are two locations, and z is an auxiliary variable ranging over the
natural numbers, andM is a unit-type computation term. This statement asserts that after executing
M , the location l′ will contain the factorial of whatever number was stored at l before starting the
computation. In the case of the total-correctness version of Hoare logic, in which M is required to
terminate, the property stated by the Hoare triple is equivalent to:10
M |=
∧
n∈N
∧
s∈NL,s(l)=n
∨
s′∈NL,s′(l′)=n!
(s֌ s′)⊤ ,
where the formula on the right expresses the combined effect of the precondition and postcondition.
Similarly, the partial correctness interpretation, under which termination is not guaranteed, is captured
by:
M |=
∧
n∈N
∧
s∈NL,s(l)=n
¬
 ∨
s′∈NL
(s֌ s′)⊤
 ∨
 ∨
s′∈NL,s′(l′)=n!
(s֌ s′)⊤
 .
10For P (x) some property on X, we write
∨
a∈X,P (a) φa for
∨
{φa | a ∈ X, P (a)}. If the predicate is always true, we
write
∨
a∈X φa. We use a similar notation for
∧
.
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Such compilations of high-level formulas (for example, Hoare triples) into low-level formulas (the
infinitary propositional modal logic) are cumbersome. Nevertheless, they serve two purposes. The first
is that translatability into the infinitary logic serves as a test for any proposed high-level specification
syntax, as the existence of such a translation guarantees that the syntax expresses only behaviourally
meaningful properties. The second purpose is that the propositional modal logic can potentially serve
as a guideline for the extraction of compositional proof rules for the high-level logic. This is based on
an interesting fact: such compositional proof rules are available for the infinitary propositional modal
logic itself. Interestingly, this property is intimately related to the notion of strong decomposability
defined in Section 4. We now expand on this point.
We consider a format for a style of compositional proof rule for programs whose outermost con-
structor is a sequential composition: let M ⇒ x in N . The proof rule we consider is specified by a
modality o ∈ O together with a family of pairs of modalities: {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I . This data determines the
let proof rule below, which makes use of the pure behavioural logic F from Section 8.
{M |= oi ψi λx : ρ.N |= ψi 7→ o
′
i φ }i∈I
let M ⇒ x in N |= o φ
(6)
In this rule, the modalities o, oi and o
′
i and their index set I have been determined by the specifying
data. The other components of the rule may be instantiated arbitrarily, thus the rule is parametric
with respect to terms M and N and the formulas φ, φi and ψi. The rule is compositional in the sense
that its premises require properties to be established of M and N separately.
Definition 9.1. A let proof rule (6) is said to be sound if, for all types ρ, τ , computation terms ⊢M : ρ
and x : ρ ⊢ N : τ , and value formulas φ ∈ VF(τ) and {ψi ∈ VF(ρ)}i∈I , the following implication holds:
∀i ∈ I (M |= oi ψi ∧ λx :ρ.N |= ψi 7→ o
′
i φ ) =⇒ let M⇒x in N |= o φ .
The modalities o and {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I required to specify a let proof rule are reminiscent of the
definition of strong decomposability 4.18. In fact, there is a precise connection. Whenever O is a
strongly decomposable set of Scott open modalities, the set of sound let proof rules is complete in the
sense of the proposition below, which informally states that every true modal property of a let term
can be proved from properties of its component terms by means of a suitably chosen sound let proof
rule.
Proposition 9.2. Suppose that O is a strongly decomposable set of Scott open modalities. Suppose
also that let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′ |= o φ′ holds (where ⊢M ′ : ρ′ and x : ρ′ ⊢ N ′ : τ ′). Then there is a sound
let proof rule (6) for o, with premise modalities {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I , such that
∀i ∈ I (M ′ |= oi ψ
′
i ∧ λx : ρ
′. N ′ |= ψ′i 7→ o
′
i φ
′ ) ,
for some choice of value formulas {ψ′i ∈ VF(ρ
′)}i∈I .
Proof. Assume that O is strongly decomposable and let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′ |= o φ′. By the operational
semantics, |let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′| = µ(|M ′|[V 7→ |N ′[V/x]|]), so
µ(|M ′|[V 7→ |N ′[V/x]|[|= φ′]]) = µ(|M ′|[V 7→ |N ′[V/x]|])[|= φ′] ∈ o({∗}) .
By strong decomposability, there is a collection {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I of pairs of modalities such that: (1)
∀i ∈ I, |M ′|[V 7→ |N ′[V/x]|[|= φ′]] ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})), and (2) ∀r ∈ TT1, if ∀i ∈ I, r ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})) then
µr ∈ o({∗}). We prove that this collection {(oi, o
′
i)}i∈I specifies the desired let proof rule for o.
Soundness: To prove that the proof rule is sound, consider types ρ and τ , terms ⊢ M : ρ and
x : ρ ⊢ N : τ , and value formulas φ ∈ VF(τ) and {ψi ∈ VF(ρ)}i∈I such that:
∀i ∈ I (M |= oi ψi and λx : ρ.N |= ψi 7→ o
′
i φ ) .
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Let r = |M |[V 7→ |N [V/x]|[|= φ]] ∈ TT1. For any i ∈ I and V such that V |= ψi, we have |N [V/x]|[|=
φ] ∈ o′i({∗}). We have by monotonicity and because |M |[|= ψi] ∈ oi({∗}), that r ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})) . This
holds for all i ∈ I, so by property (2) of strong decomposability (given above), µr ∈ o({∗}), hence
|let M ⇒ x in N |[|= φ] ∈ o({∗}) and we conclude that let M ⇒ x in N |= o φ.
Completeness: We now prove that suitable value formulas {ψ′i ∈ VF(ρ
′)}i∈I exist, allowing us to
use the rule as a method for proving that let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′ |= o φ′. For any i ∈ I, define
ψ′i :=
∨
{χV | N
′[V/x] |= o′i φ
′} ,
where χV is the characteristic function for V , as given by Lemma 5.5, but translated into the pure logic
F using Proposition 8.3. So ifW |= χV then V ⊑V W , and sinceN
′[V/x] |= o′i φ
′ and ⊑V is compatible,
N ′[W/x] |= o′i φ
′. Hence, whenever W |= ψ′i, we have that N
′[W/x] |= o′i φ
′, so λx : ρ′. N |= ψ′i 7→ o
′
i φ
′.
By the definition of ψ′i and the observation above, it holds that, for any closed value term W : ρ
′,
W |= ψ if and only if |N ′[W/x]|[|= φ′] ∈ o′i({∗}). By property (1) above of strong decomposability,
|M ′|[V 7→ |N ′[V/x]|[|= φ′]] ∈ oi(o
′
i({∗})), so |M
′|[|= ψ′] ∈ oi({∗}), and hence M
′ |= oi(ψ
′).
We remark that Proposition 9.2 also works if we restrict to the logic F+ of positive pure formulas.
We illustrate Proposition 9.2, by giving examples of complete collections of sound let proof rules
in the case of two of our example effects: global store, and probabilistic choice. For global store, such
a collection is given by let proof rules of the form:
M |= (s֌ s′′)ψ λx : ρ.N |= ψ 7→ (s′′֌ s′)φ
let M ⇒ x in N |= (s֌ s′)φ
For probabilistic choice, such a collection of rules is:
{M |= P>ai ψi λx : ρ.N |= ψi 7→ P>bi φ }
n
i=1
let M ⇒ x in N |= P>q φ
where each rule in the collection is specified by some n ≥ 1 and rationals 0 < a0 < · · · < an < 1
and 1 > b0 > · · · > bn > 0 satisfying a0b0 +
∑n
i=1(ai − ai−1)bi ≥ q . Completeness can be derived
from Proposition 9.2, using the fact that such collections {(P>ai ,P>bi)}
n
i=1 arise in the proof of strong
decomposability for the probability modalities in Section 4.
The above discussion concerns compositional proof rules for the let construction of the program-
ming language. Compositional proof rules are available for the other program constructors too. For
example, it turns out to be a consequence of Proposition 9.2 that compositional proof rules are avail-
able for the algebraic effect operations. Indeed such rules can be derived from the let proof rules by
recasting the effect operations in terms of their generic effects in the sense of Plotkin and Power [38];
for example for a binary operation:
σ(M,N) ≡ let σ(0, 1)⇒ z in case z of {Z ⇒M ; S(x)⇒ N} .
Carrying this out in full generality would be excessively technical for this late point in the paper. So
instead we illustrate the end result by giving examples of the proof rules one obtains for a selection
of the effect operations in our running examples.
In the case of nondeterminism, the only effect operation is nondeterministic choice. For this, one
obtains separate rules for the ♦ and  modalities.
M |= ♦φ
or(M,N) |= ♦φ
N |= ♦φ
or(M,N) |= ♦φ
M |= φ N |= φ
or(M,N) |= φ
For a second example, in the case of global store, one obtains the following rules for the lookupl and
updatel operations.
λx : N.M |= {s(l)} 7→ (s֌ s′)φ
lookupl(λx : N.M) |= (s֌ s
′)φ
V |= {n} M |= (s[l := n]֌ s′)φ
updatel(V ;M) |= (s֌ s
′)φ
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In all cases the rules are sound as expected, and also complete in the following sense. Every valid
assertion stating that a program whose outermost constructor is an effect operation satisfies a modal
property can be derived by one of the compositional proof rules. For example, if it is true that
updatel(V ;M) |= (s ֌ s
′)φ then there exists n such that V |= {n} and M |= (s[l := n] ֌ s′)φ.
(Indeed, let n be such that V is is the numeral n.)
There is much that is preliminary in the above account of compositional reasoning principles. As
we have already discussed, for reasoning to be practical one needs an expressive finitary program
logic, and one needs the compositional principles in the proof rules to also be expressible using the
finitary language. For example, in the case of global store, one would not use low-level modalities
of the form (s ֌ s′) where s, s′ are individual states, but rather of the form (P ֌ Q) where P
and Q are formulas in an appropriate logic for expressing general preconditions and postconditions
constraining states. Also, one would reformulate the proof rules above to directly deal with such a
practical language for preconditions and postconditions. Nonetheless, the general point remains that
such more practical constructions can be compiled down into our infinitary propositional logic and its
primitive modalities. In the end, in the case of global store, one will end up with a logic looking very
much like an extension of Hoare logic to a higher-order language (e.g., there will be some similarities
with Hoare Type Theory [29]).
Another issue we have not addressed in the discussion above is that, in general, the verification
of interesting programs will involve proving properties of open terms (with free variables) rather than
just the closed terms considered above. For this reason, one needs a proof system that deals with
sequents of the form
x1 ::φ1, . . . , xn ::φn ⊢ V ::ψ and x1 ::φ1, . . . , xn ::φn ⊢ M :: Ψ ,
where we write V ::φ and M :: Φ as syntactic assertions representing the statements V |= φ and
M |= Φ. The sequents above state that properties ψ and Ψ hold of V and M , conditional on
properties φ1, . . . , φn of the free variables. For example, with such sequents, there is then a natural
proof rule for λ-abstraction:
x1 ::φ1, . . . , xn ::φn , x ::φ ⊢ M :: Ψ
x1 ::φ1, . . . , xn ::φn ⊢ λx : ρ.M ::φ 7→ Ψ
.
Summarising the above considerations, while the infinitary modal propositional logic of the present
paper is not itself a practical vehicle for specification and verification, it may potentially inform the
design of expressive finitary logics suitable for practical specification and reasoning with effects. In
this regard, the compositional rules for the infinitary logic may provide templates for such rules in
the practical logics. Moreover, the propositional logic suggests a general sequent-based format for
verification, whose mature realisation should be something like an expressive refinement-type system
for algebraic effects, supporting compositional verification. The development of such a system is a
goal for future research.
The discussion thus far has concerned reasoning to establish assertions of the form M |= Φ stating
that an individual program satisfies a property of programs. Another important side of reasoning is
establishing equivalences M ≡ N between programs. Although a main motivation for introducing the
behavioural logic was as a means for defining equivalence between programs, we do not primarily view
it as a tool for establishing or reasoning about equivalences. Indeed, in regard to equivalences, the
logic is most easily used as a means for establishing non-equivalences between programs. In order to
show that M 6≡ N , one just needs to exhibit a property Φ that is satisfied by one of M,N but not the
other. Examples of such arguments were given in Examples 7.1 and 7.3. Using the logic as a means
for proving that two terms are equivalent is trickier since it requires showing that the terms satisfy the
same set of logical formulas. Again, one example of such an argument has been given in Example 7.1,
where two terms were shown to be equivalent with respect to mutual similarity, by showing that they
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satisfy the same positive formulas. We now give one further example of such an argument, as a means
of illustrating a general point.
The general point is that the logical properties of programs, as captured by the modalities and
their interaction with the effect operations, suffice to establish the usual equalities between algebraic
terms comprising of effect operations, which are central to Plotkin and Power’s approach to algebraic
effects [38]. For the present paper, we illustrate this using one of the equations for global store as
an example. For any value term ∅ ⊢ λx :N.M : N → τ , we prove the following equivalence between
computation terms of type τ :
updatel(n; lookupl(λx :N.M)) ≡ updatel(n;M [n/X])
By Lemma 4.4, we need only check that both sides of the equation satisfy the same formulas of the
form (s ֌ s′)φ . To show this, we argue using the proof principles discussed above for the lookupl
and updatel operations.
updatel(n; lookupl(λx :N.M)) |= (s֌ s
′)φ
iff lookupl(λx :N.M) |= (s[l := n]֌ s
′)φ
iff λx :N.M |= {n} 7→ (s[l := n]֌ s′)φ
iff M [n/x] |= (s[l := n]֌ s′)φ
iff updatel(n;M [n/X]) |= (s֌ s
′)φ
The above derivation and others like it illustrate an alternative to taking equations between al-
gebraic terms as the basic data defining the behaviour of algebraic effects, which is the mainstream
approach in the theory of algebraic effects. Instead one can take the modal behavioural properties
of effects and their associated proof principles as primitive, and then derive the equations. Indeed
the latter is the natural approach if one views the equations as expressing empirical truths about
computational behaviour rather than as a priori axiomatic facts.
10 Discussion and related work
In this paper we have introduced an infinitary propositional logic for expressing properties of programs
with algebraic effects, with the principal aim of using the logic to define behavioural equivalence for
effectful programs. Although our logics exhibit certain similarities in form with the endogenous logic
developed in Abramsky’s domain theory in logical form [3], our motivation and approach are quite
different. Whereas Abramsky shows the usefulness of an axiomatic approach to a finitary logic as
a way of characterising denotational equality, the present paper shows that there is a similar utility
in considering an infinitary logic from a semantic perspective (based on operational semantics) as a
method for defining behavioural equivalence.
In the literature, logics for effects have primarily been considered for the purpose of reasoning
about programs with effects. We review the main approaches to such logics.
Pitts’ evaluation logic was an early logic for general computational effects [34]. Evaluation logic
has built-in  and ♦ modalities, which can be given natural interpretations for some effects, but
whose interpretation in the case of other effects is rather forced. In the light of the general theory of
modalities in the present paper, it would be natural to reconsider evaluation logic with the built-in 
and ♦ modalities replaced with effect-specific modalities, as in Section 3. It is left for future work to
assess the extent to which this provides a useful basis for a program logic for effects.
The logic for algebraic effects, of Plotkin and Pretnar [40], axiomatises effectful behaviour by means
of an equational theory over a signature of effect operations, following the algebraic approach to effects
advocated by Plotkin and Power [39]. Although we also have effect operations in the present paper,
we do not take equational axioms as primitive. Instead, it is the choice of the set O of modalities
37
that determines the equational properties that the effect operations satisfy, as discussed in Section 9.
A different kind of modality is also present in the logic of Plotkin and Pretnar [40]. Their operation
modalities are generated by the signature Σ, with each modality being associated with a single effect
operation. It is our view that the behavioural modalities of the present paper provide a more natural
vocabulary for specifying and reasoning about program behaviour, as discussed in Section 9. It is
possible that a reformulation of Plotkin and Pretnar’s logic for algebraic effects, using behavioural
modalities instead of operation modalities, might provide a more usable framework for specification
and verification of programs with algebraic effects.
A different approach to logics for effects has been proposed by Goncharov, Mossakowski and
Schro¨der [28, 6]. They assume a semantic setting in which the programming language is rich enough
to contain a pure fragment that itself acts as a program logic. This approach is very powerful for
certain effects. For example, Hoare logic can be derived in the case of global store. However, it appears
not to be as adaptable across as wide a range of effects as the approach of the present paper.
The F ∗ project [47] takes a complementary approach to reasoning about effects, under which
an effectful programming language is embedded within a powerful general purpose theorem proving
environment based on dependent type theory. The framework supports a generalisation of Hoare-
logic-style reasoning, based on preconditions and postconditions, which is applicable to those effects
that can be given associated Dijkstra monads [48, 47, 4, 25]. Indeed, an underlying philosophy of the
F ∗ project is to identify, for each eligible effect, the relevant form of precondition, postcondition and
composition principle related to them. In contrast, in the logic of the present paper, the precondition-
postcondition style arises naturally for global store, as it is built into the format of the store modality
(s ֌ s′); whereas other modalities provide different specification formats that nonetheless support
compositional proof methods, as discussed in Section 9. In principle, this latter view is more general,
as there is no a priori reason to force specifications into a precondition-postcondition format. In
particular, for effects, such as input/output, in which there is observable mid-execution behaviour,
it is not clear that such a format is the most useful (although it can be achieved; see, for example
Penninckx et al. [32] and Maillard et al. [24]).
Examples in Sections 7 and 9 show how our logic can be used directly for reasoning about program
equivalence. Its main practical use in this regard is as a method of establishing non-equivalence: the
non-equivalence of M and N can be shown by exhibiting a single logical property that distinguishes
between them. In this regard, there is a useful complementarity underpinning the coincidence of
logical equivalence and bisimilarity. For, in contrast, a principal virtue of bisimilarity is that it
provides practical reasoning techniques for establishing equivalences between programs that do hold.
(Such techniques include exhibiting bisimilarities and ‘up-to’ methods [43, 45].) The relationship with
other techniques for reasoning about equivalences between applicative and effectful programs, such as
logical relations [33, 35, 5, 14, 15, 10], which are often directed towards contextual equivalence, is a
question for future investigation.
In addition to the question of reasoning about equivalences and non-equivalences, the formulation
of our logic as a language of formulas expressing behavioural properties, raises the question of its
potential usefulness as a vehicle for reasoning about properties of programs. As discussed in Section 9,
we view the infinitary propositional logic of this paper as providing a low-level language, into which
practical high-level finitary logics for expressing program properties can potentially be compiled. In
order to be sufficiently expressive, such a logic may well incorporate full first-order classical logic
(including negation), as well as logical constructs such as the definition of relations as least or greatest
fixed points, all of which are translatable into the logic of the present paper. For such an expressive
logic, bisimilarity is likely to be the only program equivalence that supports the interchangeability
property (M |= φ and M ≡ N imply N |= φ) discussed in Section 1. We view the development of
such high-level logics and their compositional reasoning principles, aimed at practical specification
and verification, as a particularly promising topic for future research.
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We end the paper with a brief discussion of some of the choices made in the present paper, and
of their extensions and limitations. The work in this paper has been carried out for fine-grained
call-by-value [22], which is equivalent to call-by-value. The definitions can, however, be adapted to
work for call-by-name, and even call-by-push-value [20]. Similarly, they can be adapted to other type
constructions such as sums, products, recursive types, and polymorphism, all of which will be addressed
in the second authors forthcoming PhD thesis. A more challenging direction for development, is to
generalise the theory to permit algebraic operations with more general arities than the possibilities
allowed in the present paper. Such a generalisation is needed to include effects such as local and/or
higher-order store. This is nontrivial at several levels. For example, the notion of effect tree requires
nontrivial modification. Also, the relevant notion of bisimilarity (so-called environmental bisimilarity
[44, 16]) is much more subtle and probably requires a logic whose formulas express relations rather
than properties.
The central notion of modality, in the present paper, was adapted from the notion of observation
in Johann et al. [14]. The crucial change is from sets of trees of type N (observations) to a set of
unit-type trees (modalities). This change allows value formulas to be lifted to computation formulas,
analogously to predicate lifting in coalgebra (cf., e.g., Jacobs [13]), which is a key characteristic of our
modalities. The properties of Scott-openness and decomposability play a similar role in the present
paper to the role they play in Johann et al. [14]. However, the notion of decomposability for modalities
(Definition 4.15) is substantially more subtle than the corresponding notion for observations in Johann
et al. [14].
There are certain limitations to the theory of modalities in the present paper. For example, for the
combination of probability and nondeterminism, one might naturally consider modalities ♦P>r and
P>r asserting the possibility and necessity of the termination probability exceeding r. However, the
decomposability property fails. (A related observation appears in Lopez and Simpson [23].) In recent
work, the second author has shown that this situation can be rescued by changing to a quantitative
logic, with a corresponding notion of quantitative modality [51].
In Hasuo [8], a general framework for quantitative effect-specific modalities is proposed, where
modalities are given by structure maps TA→ A for algebras for a monad T , with A being an object
of (potentially quantitative) truth values. From a semantic perspective, the Scott-open modalities of
the present paper can be equivalently described as continuous functions from TS→ S, where S is the
two element Sierpinski-space domain {⊥,⊤}. In general, they are not, however, algebras for the tree
monad T . We leave a thorough comparison of the approach of the present paper (and its quantitative
generalisation) with the proposed framework of Hasuo [8] for future work.
One topic we have not touched upon in the paper is extending the programming language with
handlers, which are powerful control operators associated with algebraic effects [41]. If added to the
language in unrestricted form, handlers violate the usual equations associated with algebraic effects.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to consider if our modalities can be used, on the one hand, to reason
about handlers, and, on the other, to help constrain handlers to ‘safe’ usages that respect the expected
program equivalences. For example, various operators from concurrency can be defined using handlers
[1, 50], and it would be interesting to see if this allows the usual Hennessy-Milner logic to be subsumed
in our setting.
Acknowledgements. We thank Francesco Gavazzo, Aliaume Lopez and the anonymous conference
and journal reviewers for helpful discussions and comments.
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A Howe’s method proof
In this appendix, we give the details that were left out from the Howe’s method proof in Section 6.
The results in this appendix are indexed according to whether they were previously stated in Section
6 or are only stated here. Remember the definitions of the Howe closure given in Definition 6.1. We
first look at some preliminary results, mostly from Lassen [19].
Lemma 6.2. If R is reflexive, then:
1. R• is compatible, hence reflexive.
2. R◦ ⊆ R•.
3. If x : ρ ⊢ AR•B and V,W : ρ such that V R•W , then A[V ]R•B[W ]
Proof. This proof is adapted from [19, Lemma 3.8.2]. We prove the properties separately.
1. Since R is reflexive, so is R◦. Hence R̂• = R̂•id ⊆ R̂•R◦ = R•.
2. Note that the compatible refinement of a reflexive relation is reflexive (since the compatible
refinement rules line up with the typing rules). Hence R̂• is reflexive, since R• is. So R◦ =
id R◦ ⊆ R̂•R◦ = R•.
3. This requires an induction on the shape of A (which may be a value or a computation). If
{x} ⊢ AR•B then by HC or HV we have {x} ⊢ A R̂• C and {x} ⊢ CR◦B. So we know
C[W ]R◦B[W ]. We need to prove, A[V ] R̂• C[W ]. In each of the cases of A, {x} ⊢ A R̂• C
is derived from rule Cn for some number n. This rule has as its premise some sequence of
relations AiR
•Ci. By induction hypothesis we have Ai[V ]R
• Ci[W ], this is also trivially true
in the base cases n ∈ {1, 2} since then the sequence is empty. Using Cn we can then derive that
A[V ] R̂• C[W ]. Hence by HV or HC we get A[V ]R•B[W ]. One can verify that this argument
works for each of the cases of Cn.
We can also say something about composing the Howe closure with the original relation, which by
Lemma 5.6 works well with our relator.
Lemma A.1. If R is a preorder relation on closed terms, then we have:
1. If AR•B and BR◦C, then AR• C.
2. For closed terms M,N,K such that |M | O(R•) |N | and |N | O(R) |K| we have |M | O(R•) |K|.
Proof. We proof the properties individually.
1. We use thatR is transitive, henceR◦ is transitive meaningR◦R◦ ⊆ R◦. Hence withR• = R̂•R◦
we have R•R◦ = (R̂•R◦)R◦ ⊆ R̂•R◦ = R•.
2. This follows from applying Lemma 5.6 to the previous statement.
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Lastly, we prove the result needed to deal with the O-bisimilarity.
Lemma 6.5. If R◦ is symmetric and reflexive, then R•∗ (the transitive closure of R•) is symmetric.
Proof. This proof is taken from [19, Lemma 3.8.2(4)]. Looking at the compatible refinement rules, it
is not difficult to see Ŝop = Ŝop for any relation S. From Lemma 6.2 we know that R◦ ⊆ R•, and R•
is compatible hence R̂•∗ ⊆ R•∗. So we get that:
R̂•∗opR◦ = R̂•∗opR◦op = R̂•∗
op
R◦op ⊆
R•∗opR◦op ⊆ R•∗opR•op = R•op∗R•op = R•op∗ = R•∗op
Hence R•∗op is a solution for S to the inclusion ŜR◦ ⊆ S. Since R• is the least solution, we have
R• ⊆ R•∗op. So if AR•∗ B, then A = C0R
• C1R
• . . .R• Cn−1 = B for some choice of sequence
{Ci}i∈I , so we can derive that A = C0R
•∗op C1R
•∗op . . . R•∗op Cn−1 = B meaning AR
•∗opB. We
conclude that BR•∗A, so R•∗ is symmetric.
Now we specifically take R to be a pre-order O-simulation ⊑. We assume O to be a decomposable
set of Scott open modalities. The lemmas stated before are satisfied, hence we know that (⊑◦) ⊆ (⊑•)
by Lemma 6.2. We prove that ⊑• is an O-simulation, starting with condition 1 of Definition 5.2:
Lemma A.2. If for V,W : N we have V ⊑• W , then V =W .
Proof. For a value term V of type N, we have that V = n for some natural number n. Assume
n ⊑• W , then for some L we have n ⊑̂•L and L ⊑ W . The latter means L = W by property 1 of
O-simulations, so n ⊑• W ⇒ n ⊑̂•W . If n = 0 and hence n = Z, then n ⊑̂•W must have been derived
from C2, so W = Z = n. As an induction step, we assume n ⊑• W ⇒ n = W and n+ 1 ⊑• W ′.
We derive S(n) ⊑̂•W ′ which must be from C3 hence W ′ = S(K) where n ⊑• K. So by assumption
n = K which means n+ 1 =W ′. We can conclude by induction that V = n ⊑• W ⇒ V =W .
So condition 1 of Definition 5.2 holds. Condition 3 is satisfied by compatibility of ⊑• (shown in
Lemma 6.2), specifically by rule C6 of compatibility. Condition 2 is the most difficult to prove and
requires an induction on the reduction relation of terms. In the order of trees, |M |n ≤ |M |n+1 and
|M | =
⊔
n |M |n. So by the properties in Lemma 5.9 we have:
|M | O(⊑) |N | ⇔ ∀n, |M |nO(⊑) |N |
Now for the important result, following the techniques used in [17].
Lemma 6.4 (Key Lemma). For any n ∈ N, given two closed computation terms A and B, if A ⊑• B
then |A|nO(⊑
•) |B|.
Proof. We do an induction on n.
Base case, where n = 0, which means |A|n = ⊥. So we have |A|0 = ⊥ ≤ |B|. By Lemma 6.2 we
know ⊑• is reflexive, so using Lemma 5.9 we get |A|0O(⊑
•) |B|.
Induction step (n + 1). We assume as the Induction Hypothesis that for any two terms A′ and
B′, if A′ ⊑• B′ and k ≤ n we have |A′|kO(⊑
•) |B′|. We want to prove |A|n+1O(⊑
•) |B|.
By HC in Definition 6.1, there is a C such that A ⊑̂• C and C ⊑ B. Since ⊑ is an O-simulation,
we have |C| O(⊑) |B|. So we aim to prove that |A|n+1O(⊑
•) |C| such that by Lemma A.1 we get
|A|n+1O(⊑
•) |B|. To prove this, we do a case distinction on the shape of A to derive: ∀A,A ⊑̂• C ⇒
|A|n+1O(⊑
•) |C|.
1. A = return(V ) : τ , we have |A|n+1 = η(V ) and return(V ) ⊑̂• C. This is only possible from
rule C4, meaning C = return(W ) and V ⊑• W . By Lemma 5.8 we have η(V )O(⊑•) η(W ),
hence |A|n+1 = |return(V )|n+1 = η(V )O(⊑
•) η(W ) = |return(W )| = |C|. That concludes this
case.
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2. A = (λx : τ.M)V : ρ, hence |A|n+1 = |M [V/x]|n. We have (λx : τ.M)V ⊑̂•C which can only
be concluded from C6. Hence C =WU for some value terms W and U , with (λx : τ.M) ⊑• W
and V ⊑• U . Now (λx : τ.M) ⊑• W can only be from a combination of rule HV with C5,
hence we have {x} ⊢M ⊑• L and λx : τ.L ⊑W . From {x} ⊢M ⊑• L, V ⊑• U and Lemma 6.2
we get M [V/x] ⊑• L[U/x], hence by the induction hypothesis, |M [V/x]|nO(⊑
•) |L[U/x]|. Since
λx : τ.L ⊑ W , we have (λx : τ.L)U ⊑ WU = C, hence with |(λx : τ.L)U | = |L[U/x]| it holds
that |L[U/x]| O(⊑) |WU | = |C|, so by Lemma A.1, |(λx : τ.M)V ]|n+1 = |M [V/x]|nO(⊑
•) |C|.
3. A = fix(F ) : ρ → τ , we have fix(F ) ⊑̂• C which can only be concluded from C7, hence C =
fix(F ′) and F ⊑• F ′. Take f : (ρ→ τ)→ (ρ→ τ) ⊢ N : ρ→ τ to be the following term:
N := return λx : ρ.let f(λy : ρ.let fix f ⇒ z in zy)⇒ w in wx
This value term has been specifically chosen such that fix(G) reduces in one step to N [G/f ] for
any term G, so |fix(G)|n+1 = |N [G/f ]|n. We have N ⊑
• N by reflexivity, hence with F ⊑• F ′
and Lemma 6.2 we get N [F ] ⊑• N [F ′/f ]. Hence |fix(F )|n+1 = |N [F/f ]|nO(⊑
•) |N [F ′/f ]| =
|fix(F ′)| = |C| by the induction hypothesis.
4. A = case V of {Z ⇒ M ;S(x) ⇒ N} : τ , then A ⊑̂• C can only be concluded from C8, hence
C = case V ′ of {Z ⇒ M ′;S(x) ⇒ N ′} for some terms V ′, M ′, and N ′ where V ⊑• V ′,
M ⊑• M ′, and {x} ⊢ N ⊑• N ′. Since V ⊑• V ′ we have V = V ′ by Lemma A.2. We do a case
distinction on V .
(a) If V = Z = V ′, then |A|n+1 = |M |n by the reduction relation. Using the induction
hypothesis on M ⊑• M ′ we have |M |nO(⊑
•) |M ′| = |case Z of {Z ⇒M ′;S(x)⇒ N ′}| =
|C|, so we are finished.
(b) If V = S(W ) = V ′, then |A|n+1 = |N [W/x]|n. By {x} ⊢ N ⊑
• N ′ we have N [W/x] ⊑•
N ′[W/x] (Lemma 6.2), hence by the induction hypothesis,
|A|n+1 = |N [W/x]|nO(⊑
•) |N ′[W/x]| = |C|.
5. A = let M ⇒ x in N : ρ. Looking at the let-term, one can observe that we have the following
upper bound
|let M ⇒ x in N |n+1 ≤ |M |n[L 7→ |N [L/x]|n].
The only derivation of A ⊑̂•C is by C9, from which we know that C = let M ′ ⇒ x in N ′ for
some terms M ′ and N ′, where M ⊑• M ′ and {x} ⊢ N ⊑• N ′. Using the above observation we
know that |A|n+1 ≤ |M |n[L 7→ |N [L/x]|n] and |C| = |M
′|[L 7→ |N ′[L/x]|]. Using property 1 of
Corollary 5.11, we want to prove that |M |n[L 7→ |N [L/x]|n] O(⊑
•) |M ′|[L 7→ |N ′[L/x]|].
Note that for all L ⊑• L′ it holds by {x} ⊢ N ⊑• N ′ and Lemma 6.2 that N [L/x] ⊑• N ′[L′/x].
Hence by the induction hypothesis: |N [L/x]|n O(⊑
•) |N ′[L′/x]|. Define function f, g : Val(τ)→
TCom(ρ) where f(L) := |N [L/x]|n and g(L
′) := |N ′[L′/x]|. We also have by the induction
hypothesis on M ⊑• M ′ that |M |nO(⊑
•) |M ′|. Take t = |M |n and r = |M
′|. So we can use
property 1 of Corollary 5.11 on f , g, t, and r to conclude that |A|n+1 ≤
|M |n[L 7→ |N [L/x]|n] = t[L 7→ f(L)] O(⊑
•) r[L′ 7→ g(L′)] = |M ′|[L 7→ |N ′[L/x]|] = |C| .
Using a combination of property 1 of Lemma 5.9 to prove |A|n+1O(id) t[L 7→ f(L)], and property
2 of Lemma 5.6 we can derive |A|n+1O(⊑
•) |C|.
6. A = σ(M0,M1, . . . ,Mm−1) : τ where σ : α
m → α. The statement A ⊑̂•C can only follow from
CA, hence C = σ(M ′0,M
′
1, . . . ,M
′
m−1) where for all i, Mi ⊑
• M ′i . By the induction hypothesis,
|Mi|nO(⊑
•) |M ′i |, hence |A|n+1 = σ{i 7→ |Mi|n}O(⊑
•)σ{i 7→ |M ′i |} = |C| by property 2 of
Corollary 5.11.
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7. A = σ(V ) : τ where σ : αN → α. The statement A ⊑̂• C follows only from CB, hence C = σ(V ′)
where V ⊑• V ′ meaning for any m : N we have V m ⊑• V ′m. By the induction hypothesis,
|V m|nO(⊑
•) |V ′m|, hence |A|n+1 = σ{m 7→ |V m|n}O(⊑
•)σ{m 7→ |V ′m|} = |C| by property 2
of Corollary 5.11.
8. A = σ(V, t) : τ where either t = (M0, . . . ,Mn−1) or t = W . Very similar to the previous cases,
from either CC or CD we have C = σ(V ′, t′) where t ⊑• t′ and V ⊑• V ′ hence V = V ′ : N by
Lemma A.2. The rest follows by repeating the proof in the previous cases depending on what
shape t is.
We can conclude that M ⊑• N ⇒ |M |nO(⊑
•) |N | for any n. Hence with |M | = ⊔n|M |n and
Lemma 5.9 we can finally conclude |M | O(⊑•) |N |. Hence the relation ⊑• satisfies all conditions of
Definition 5.2, resulting in the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3. If O is a decomposable set of Scott open modalities, then for any preorder applicative
O-simulation ⊑, the Howe closure ⊑• limited to closed terms is an applicative O-simulation.
Proof. By Lemma A.2, ⊑• satisfies condition (1) of being an O-simulation. By Lemma 6.4 and
|M | = ⊔n|M |n for any term M , it satisfies condition (2). By compatibility it satisfies condition (3).
We conclude that ⊑• is an O-simulation.
The Howe’s method proof is finalised in Section 6 with Theorem 3 A and B and their proofs.
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